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The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky
Laws
By David M. Levine and Adam C. Pritchard*

INTRODUCTION
It is often said that California sets the pace for changes in America's
tastes. Trends established in California often find their way into the heartland, having a profound effect on our nation's cultural scene. Nouvelle
cuisine, the dialect of the Valley Girl and rollerblading all have their genesis on the West Coast. The most recent trend to emerge from California,
instead of catching on in the rest of the country, has been stopped dead
in its tracks by a legislative rebuke from Washington, D.C. California's
latest, albeit short-lived, contribution to the nation was a migration of
securities fraud class actions from federal to state court.
This migration had its origin in Washington, D.C., not Los Angeles.
Less than three years ago, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act, Act, or PSLRA).I The corporate lobby
and professionals who serve corporations persuaded Congress that companies and their managers were being harassed by class action lawyers
more concerned with a case's settlement value (and potential attorneys'

*Mr. Levine is Senior Advisor to the Director of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission), formerly, Special Assistant to the SEC's General Counsel. Mr. Pritchard is Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School, formerly, Senior
Counsel in the SEC's Office of General Counsel. Both authors assisted in preparing the
SEC's response to prior versions of the preemption bill discussed in this Article.
The SEC, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or
statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the authors' colleagues on the
staff of the Commission. 17 C.ER. § 200.735-4(e)(2) (1998).
The authors thank Richard H. Walker, Director of Enforcement at the Commission, for
his support and numerous suggestions. The authors also wish to thank Ross Albert, Frank
Balotti (the referee),Joan Larsen, Gordon Seymour, and Erika Singer for editorial suggestions
on previous drafts of this Article, EevaJoensuu for excellent word processing, and Wallace
Rogers for helping us keep our sources straight.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
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fees) than its merits.2 In response to that perceived abuse, Congress enacted
the Reform Act, a series of primarily procedural measures making it more
3
difficult to bring securities fraud class actions.
Three years after its passage, the Act has greatly altered the course of
securities litigation; however, its effect on capital formation and investor
protection remains uncertain. One result of the Reform Act became clear
soon after its passage although it seems not to have been anticipated by
Congress. The Act's sweeping reform, directed largely at securities fraud
class actions brought in federal court, leaves state securities fraud actions
untouched. 4 Class action lawyers sought to avoid the restrictions imposed
by the Reform Act by resorting to state law actions brought in state court.
The majority of the state class actions filed since passage of the Reform
Act have been filed in California. 5 The first part of this Article assesses
the evidence showing a migration to California state court. 6 The authors
conclude that claims regarding the magnitude of migration to state court
were overblown, but that parallel state and federal cases were a serious
problem for corporate issuers forced to defend such dual-track litigation
and that state liability concerns threatened to undermine the Reform Act's
7
safe harbor for forward-looking statements.
The rise of state court class actions led California-based issuers, particularly high-technology companies located in Silicon Valley, to Washington seeking further legislation restricting such suits. 8 Shifting securities
fraud litigation to state court, they argued, would undermine the effectiveness of the Reform Act. Congress once again responded by recently
passing the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (Uniform
2. This was Congress' position. The authors express no view on whether the evidence
presented to Congress supports the conclusion that frivolous securities litigation was a substantial problem. In addition, please note that, while this Article discusses certain litigation
tactics employed by the plaintiffs' bar post-Reform Act, these tactics were permissible by law
and within the scope of the ethics rules.
3. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 109 Stat. 737; see also Statement
of Managers-The "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995," 141 CONG. REc.
H 13699 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) [hereinafter Statement of Managers] ("The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of American capital markets to allow
this system to be undermined by those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing abusive
and meritless suits."). Other than clarifying that the SEC has aiding and abetting authority,
the Reform Act does not apply to Commission actions.
4. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism:Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes
of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 287 (1998) ("For the most part,.... Congress seems to have
viewed litigation reform as a federal problem that required a federal solution.").
5. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
8. See Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang; An Influential Industry With Lots of Money Is Getting
Its Way on Capitol Hill, N.Y TIMES, June 11, 1998, at D1. The main lobbying group for
preemption, comprised primarily of Silicon Valley representatives, is known as the "Uniform
Standards Coalition." Id.
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Standards Act), which preempts most securities fraud class actions brought
in state court.9 The President signed the Uniform Standards Act into law
on November 3, 1998.10
The second part of this Article addresses the Uniform Standards Act
and its likely effects on securities fraud class actions.11 Congress did not
pass a law simply precluding all state securities actions. Instead, the final
product was considerably more complex, preempting only certain categories of class actions. The Uniform Standards Act includes a unique
definition of "class action," coverage limited to nationally traded securities
and a number of carve-outs from the general preemptive effect of the
statute. This Article looks behind the sparse legislative reports for the bills
to help shed light on the statute's complexities. This Article discusses the
concerns raised by the Commission, the Uniform Standards Coalition, the
securities bar, and academics, and how those concerns shaped the main
provisions of the Uniform Standards Act. 12 The Article also offers predictions on how the Act is likely to be interpreted. 13
The Uniform Standards Act makes federal antifraud provisions, governed by the Reform Act, the exclusive national standard for most securities fraud class actions. The securities litigation reform movement, both
in 1995 and in 1998, sought to strike a new balance between capital formation and investor protection. The Reform Act adjusted that balance in
a way that favored corporate issuers by placing limits on federal securities
class actions. Most state blue-sky laws, by contrast, afford investors broader
relief than currently available under federal law, including longer statutes
of limitations and aiding and abetting liability.14 The Uniform Standards
Act seeks to bolster a number of the Reform Act's principal provisions by
eliminating the recourse of most investors to state law remedies. Thus, it
provides an appropriate occasion to address the current status of the national standard under federal law to evaluate whether capital formation
9. S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1998). The Senate passed an earlier version of Senate Bill 1260
on May 13, 1998. On July 22, 1998, the House passed an amended version of Senate Bill
1260 which struck all information after the enacting clause and inserted instead the provisions
of House Bill 1689. On July 29, 1998, the Senate announced its disagreement with the
House's amendment to Senate Bill 1260 and requested a conference. The House agreed to
a conference. On October 9, 1998, a conference report on Senate Bill 1260 was filed. See
H.R. CONF. REP. 105-803 (1998).
10. Pub. L. No., 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (to be codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
11. See infra notes 94-175 and accompanying text.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 103-72
13. See infra text accompanying notes 99-175.
14. See Oversight Hearing on SecuritiesLitigation Abuses Concerning S. 1260, The SecuritiesLitigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1997, Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous.,
and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 19-20 (Oct. 29, 1997) [hereinafter October 29 Hearing] (noting
that 49 states allow for some form of aiding and abetting liability and 33 states have statutes
of limitations longer than the federal period).
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and investor protection concerns remain properly balanced. In order to
assess that national standard, this Article discusses the most recent data
on the effect of the Reform Act, including certain developments which, if
continued, could mean that the national standard bars certain meritorious
claims. 15 This Article focuses, in particular, on the threat to recklessness
as the scienter standard for pleading and proving securities fraud.
Finally, this Article assesses the likely effectiveness of the Uniform Standards Act in creating a national standard and concludes that while the
Uniform Standards Act should afford issuers more certainty as to liability
exposure, a genuine national standard is unlikely to emerge. Institutional
investors continue to be able to proceed against issuers in state court, but
small investors cannot afford to bring individual actions in state court.
This preferential access for large investors means that the Uniform Standards Act is unlikely to create a single national standard. Rather, the Uniform Standards Act creates a "two-tiered" justice system, favoring institutional investors and wealthy individuals with superior state remedies.
Small investors are relegated to the rigorous standards set by federal law
for bringing class actions.
THE REFORM ACT AND REACTION: MIGRATION
TO STATE COURT
THE REFORM ACT
The Reform Act significantly rewrote the rules governing private federal
securities fraud lawsuits. The Act raised the bar at several points in the
litigation process, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring these actions. Its key provisions include the following:
Heightened pleading standards: Plaintiffs must plead facts giving rise to a
"strong inference" that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind for fraud. In addition, if pleading on information and belief, plaintiffs
16
are required to state all facts underlying those beliefs.
Stay of discovery: Plaintiffs have no access to discovery while a motion to
dismiss is pending under most circumstances. As a practical matter, the
discovery stay ensures that every complaint will be met by a motion to
dismiss and plaintiffs can no longer use discovery to frame an adequate
complaint. 17
Safe harborforforward-lookinginformation: Unrealized material forecasts are
not subject to liability if the forecast was accompanied by meaningful
cautionary language or the forecast was not knowingly false when made. 18
Lead plaintiff presumption: The Reform Act designates as the most ade15.
16.
(1994
17.
18.

See infra notes 176-273 and accompanying text.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 21D(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(b)(2)
& Supp. 11 1996).
Exchange Act § 21D(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(b)(3)(B).
4
Exchange Act § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u- (g)(10).
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quate plaintiff the plaintiff or group of plaintiffs having the largest financial stake in the case. The most adequate plaintiff selects class counsel
subject to court approval. This provision is designed to encourage institutional investors to take charge of securities class actions.' 9
Other significant provisions include a mandatory Rule 1120 inquiry at
the conclusion of each case 2' and proportionate, as opposed to joint and
several, liability for defendants who acted with a less-than-knowing state
22
of mind (i.e., recklessness).
The Reform Act continues a judicial trend toward narrowing the availability of relief for investors under the federal securities laws. A number
of U.S. Supreme Court cases decided over the last two decades have limited the rights and remedies available under the federal securities laws. 23
Most notable are two recent decisions holding that there is no private right
of action for aiding and abetting a violation of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and imposing a short statute of limitations for anti-fraud actions. 2 4 The combined effect of legislative and judicial reforms has made
it increasingly difficult for investors to sue under the federal securities laws.
19. Exchange Act § 2 1D(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i)(2)(iii)(I).
20. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
21. See Exchange Act § 21D(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1). Sanctions were imposed recently
for the first time pursuant to this provision. In Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P v. The Richard E.
Jacobs Group, Inc., 985 E Supp. 427, 433 (S.D.N.Y 1997), the plaintiff filed an action alleging
violations of Exchange Act Rule 1Ob-13 (17 CER. § 240.1Ob-13 (1998)) and seeking injunctive relief. The rule places restrictions on the conduct of those making tender offers. The
plaintiff and its counsel were each fined $50,000 for failing to address a precedent holding
that there is no private right of action under Rule lOb-13. Moreover, the plaintiff failed to
recognize that the transaction at issue was a merger, not a tender offer. All previous inquiries
under this provision had resulted in decisions by the court not to impose sanctions. See Scott
v. Sheingold, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15810 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998); Richter v. Achs, 174
ER.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 1031, 1036-37
(W.D. Pa. 1997); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., No. 96-1077-k (S.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 1996)
(order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University
of Maryland School of Law).
22. Exchange Act § 21D(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2)(4), (g)(2)(B)(i), (g)(10).
23. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (holding that, absent a duty to disclose, a
tippee's use of material nonpublic information does not violate § 10(b)); Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 701 (1980) (holding that scienter is a required element of a § 10(b) action); Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (concluding that silence, absent a duty to disclose,
does not violate § 10(b)); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (concluding that absent deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, acts of corporate mismanagement do not violate § 10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976)
(holding that scienter is a required element of a private § 10(b) action); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-33 (1975) (holding that a private action under Rule
1Ob-5 may only be brought by actual purchasers or sellers of securities); see also Richard H.
Walker & David M. Levine, The Limits of CentralBank's Textualist Approach-Attempts to Overdraw
The Bank Prove Unsuccessful, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 3 (1997).
24. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (aiding and abetting);
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (statute of
limitations).
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NEWFOUND INTEREST IN STATE COURTS
These restrictions on federal relief provoked new interest in state law,
and a corresponding response to close off that alternative to federal law.
Two phenomena, both centered in California, were the catalysts for the
preemption movement that culminated in the Reform Act. The first was
Proposition 211,25 a plaintiff-friendly California ballot initiative that would
have greatly expanded private rights of action under California's securities
law. The second was the "migration" of securities class actions from federal to state court in the wake of the Reform Act's tough new standards
for federal cases.

26

Proposition 211
Proposition 211 would have made California courts a utopia for the
plaintiffs' bar. The proposition's most controversial provisions included the
following: the extension of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance to common law fraud actions, in which punitive damages are available; 27 the imposition of liability on those who "participated or assisted"
in a fraud; 28 mandatory punitive damages when the conduct involved was
"willful, outrageous, or despicable;" 29 joint and several liability for all defendants; a bar preventing issuers from indemnifying any of their officers
or directors; and no cap on attorneys' fees. 30 The proposition was regarded
as a blatant attempt by the plaintiffs' bar to counteract the Reform Act. 31
Unfortunately for its advocates, their effort backfired: after being rejected
by California's voters, Proposition 211 launched the preemption movement that led to the Uniform Standards Act.
Proposition 211 ignited a firestorm of opposition nationwide. Both sides
spent extravagantly, making it the most expensive ballot initiative in California's history.32 If passed, its extreme provisions would have chilled corporate disclosure. 33 The measure was soundly defeated by a three-to-one

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 211 (West).
See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 211 § 2.
Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 5.

31. See Neil A. Lewis, CaliforniaMeasure Could Trump US. Law on SecuritiesSuits, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 30, 1996, at A 13.
32. See David S. Jackson, Litigation Valley, TIME, Nov. 4, 1996, at 72 ("The battle over
Proposition 211 is already the most expensive ballot initiative in history. Nearly $46 million
has been spent so far, the bulk coming from opponents, including the Big Six accounting
firms and high-tech firms from Apple to Xilinx.").
33. See, e.g., Louise Kehoe, Intel to Stop PublishingBusiness Forecasts, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1996,

at 32 (stating that the potential passage of Proposition 211 caused Intel to cease making
forecasts).
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margin,3 4 but even before the votes were counted, opponents of the initiative were considering alternative strategies in the event it passed. The
strategy chosen was a legislative initiative that would preempt Proposition
211 and any other similar measures adopted in other states. Proposition
211 opponents, fresh from their victory at the California ballot box, turned
their attention to Washington, D.C., seeking federal legislation to ensure
35
that similar initiatives did not resurface in any state.
Migration or Not?
The preemption movement was also fueled by the so-called migration
of securities class actions from federal to state court in the wake of the
Reform Act. Preemption proponents argued that the goals of the Reform
Act were being thwarted by a movement of litigation activity to state court,
where the Act does not apply:
I'm very proud of the fact that in the last Congress... we were able
to pass a piece of legislation aimed at doing something about this
situation that had arisen where we had especially new growth companies plagued with lawsuits, often being forced to settle out of court,
...creating a system of parasites who were literally bleeding the life
blood out of growth companies in America.... We discovered ...
that [there] has simply been a shift of all these lawsuits into state
court.

36

In particular, preemption proponents alleged that state courts were being
used to circumvent the Reform Act's safe harbor for forward-looking state38
ments, discovery stay,3 7 and its heightened pleading standards.
Three studies have attempted to count securities class actions in state
courts before and after the Reform Act. 39 The only consistent finding
among the studies is that in 1996, the first year following passage of the

34. See Elizabeth Corcoran, California Voters Rject Proposition 211, WASH. POST, Nov. 7,
1996, at D3.
35. See October 29 Hearing,supra note 14, at 37 ("[W]ithout a national standard for liability,
the potential threat is always there that one state will change its laws in such a way as to
become the haven for litigation. This almost happened in California last year with Proposition
211. The potential remains it could successfully happen elsewhere in the future.") (statement
of Senator Christopher Dodd). The fear that measures similar to Proposition 211 would be
introduced in other states has so far proved to be unfounded. So far as the authors are aware,
there have been no efforts made to liberalize the blue sky laws of any other state.
36. October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 4, 6 (statement of Senator Phil Gramm).
37. See infra notes 51 & 54 and accompanying text.
38. See Perino, supra note 4.
39. JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM:
THE FIRST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE (1997) [hereinafter STANFORD STUDY]; DENISE N. MARTIN ET AL., NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RECENT TRENDS IV: WHAT
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40
Act, state filings increased, and in 1997 the number materially decreased.
The studies diverge concerning the number of suits, if any, filed in state

court in the years leading up to the Reform Act. 4 1 Accordingly, it remains
unclear if the state court filings in 1996 represented a "migration" by
plaintiffs to state court. If the filing of state court class actions was not a
new phenomenon, it is difficult to infer that the state court filings represented an attempt to circumvent the Reform Act. It also remains unclear
whether the number of state suits witnessed in 1997 has returned to preAct levels. The findings of the studies are as follows:
Number of State Court Securities Class Actions

Year

Stanford Study42

NERA Study

1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991

n/a
69
de minimis
de minimis
de minimis
de minimis
de minimis

110
57
72
47
34
49

5743

Price Waterhouse Study
44

66
52
67
47
31
46

The results are too inconsistent to draw any policy prescriptions from
them. According to both the National Economic Research Associates
(NERA) and Price Waterhouse studies, the number of securities class actions filed in state court in 1997 is on par with the number filed prior to
the Reform Act. In fact, NERA issued a press release stating that the 1996
trends in the number of state class action filings were "transient." 44 Moreover, according to the Price Waterhouse study, it is unclear if the number
ever increased post-Reform Act. Price Waterhouse's data equates to an
average of 55 securities class actions filed per year in state court during
1996 and 1997; the average number filed per year from 1991 through
EXPLAINS FILINGS AND SETTLEMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS AcTIONS? (1996) [hereinafter NERA STUDY]; PRICE WATERHOUSE, PRICE WATERHOUSE LITIGATION REFORM
STUDY (1997) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law)
[hereinafter PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY].
40. See STANFORD STUDY, supra note 39, at 8; NERA STUOY, supra note 39, at Table 4;
and PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY, supra note 39, at 1.
41. See STANFORD STUDY, supra note 39, at 8; NERA STUDY, supra note 39, at Table 4;
and PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY, supra note 39, at 1.

42. The Stanford Study analyzes the number of state filings in 1996 only. STANFORD
STUDY, supra note 39, at 8. As for years prior to passage of the Act, the Stanford Study notes,
"Counsel with substantial experience in litigating securities fraud matters suggest that the
volume of class action securities fraud litigation in state court has, until passage of the Reform
Act, been de minimis." Id. at 7.
43. Annualized figure based on January to April 1997 data.
44. Press Release, NERA, Federal Shareholder Class Action FilingsRise to Pre-Reform Act Levels As
State FilingsFall (1997) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
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1995 was approximately 49.45 The authority of the numbers is further
undermined by the fact that Price Waterhouse, in a letter to Senator Alfonse D'Amato, restated its count on the eve of a Senate hearing on the
Uniform Standards Act. 46 Claiming that the methodology employed by
Securities Class Action Alert, the service it used to provide the figures, was
flawed, Price Waterhouse's revised figures display that the average number
of state suits filed in 1996 and 1997 grew 355% over the 1991 to 1995
average.

47

Whether or not there has been a migration of class actions to state court
in the wake of the Reform Act, such litigation is highly concentrated in
just one state: California. On August 17, 1998, the Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse, administered by the Stanford University Law School, listed
120 class actions filed in state court during 1996 and 1997.48 Of the 120,
the state in which the action was filed could be discerned for 78. The
49
overwhelming majority of these-fifty-seven-were filed in California.
Accordingly, approximately 73% of the state class actions were filed in
50
California.

PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE MIGRATION
Circumvention of the Discovery Stay
The most problematic aspect of the migration has been the filing of
parallel lawsuits, one at the state level and a second at the federal level.
Discovery obtained in the state case may then be used in the federal case
51
where it would otherwise be unavailable due to the federal discovery stay.
45. PRICE WATERHOUSE STUDY, supra note 39, at 1.
46. Letter from Daniel V Dooley, Partner, Price Waterhouse L.L.P, to Senator Alfonse
M. D'Amato, Chairman, Senate Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs Comm. (Feb. 20, 1998)
(on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
47. Id. at 2. The letter does not clearly explain the flaw but it appears Price Waterhouse
is claiming Securities Class Action Alert did not properly account for parallel federal-state
filings. Id. at 1.
48. Robert Crown Law Library, Stanford University School of Law, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: State Court Cases: State Court Securities Class Actions (last modified
Aug. 17, 1998) <http://securities.stanford.edu>.
49. None of the other 13 states where securities class actions were filed during these same
years comes close to California in number of suits filed: Arizona (2), Colorado (1), Florida
(2), Georgia (2), Illinois (3), Maryland (1), Minnesota (1), Montana (1), New Jersey (1), New
York (3), Ohio (1), Texas (2),and Tennessee (1). Id.
50. See also Oversight Hearing on SecuritiesLitigation Abuses, Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 36 (July 24, 1997) (testimony of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (noting that as of July 24, 1997, approximately 60% of the state
securities class actions had been filed in California).
51. See Edward Brodsky, Discovery Abuses: A Shjfiing Target?, N.Y LJ., Apr. 9, 1997, at 3
("[A] plaintiff can file an action in state court and secure substantial discovery barred by the
Reform Act. Based on its findings through discovery, plaintiff could then determine whether
to maintain the state action, file a parallel proceeding in federal court or dismiss the state
action in favor of the federal action.").

10
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Of the 280 federal securities class actions filed during 1996 and 1997, 51
(18%) can be tied to a parallel state case. 52 The number of parallel actions
abated slightly in 1997. Thirty-one of the 105 (30%) federal class actions
filed during 1996 had a state counterpart, but only 20 of the 175 (12%)
federal class actions filed during 1997 had a companion state case. 53 The
majority of the 51 parallel state cases (32 of the 51 (63%)) were brought
in one state: California.
These parallel lawsuits are difficult to justify: they create wasteful duplication and undermine Congress' purposes in enacting the discovery stay.
While the authors were preparing the SEC's Report to the President and
Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, a number of issuers reported that defending
54
on two fronts has made securities litigation more expensive than ever.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the incidence of dual-track litigation would have continued to increase but for the Uniform Standards

Act. A recent California state appellate decision, Oak Technology v. Superior
Court of Santa Clara,55 encourages plaintiffs'
more aggressively. Oak Technology represents
pellate court on the issue of whether a state
ery in a securities action when a parallel

lawyers to pursue this tactic
the first ruling by a state aptrial court should stay discovfederal suit has been filed. 5 6

52. See Karen Donovan, Full Stopfor Fraud Suits in States?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 23, 1998, at
Al (reporting SEC's numbers on parallel federal and state suits).
53. Id.
54. SEC, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
g
CONGRESS ON T-El FIRST YEAR Or PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITI-

GATION Ri.iFoRM ACT OF 1995 (1997) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT]; see also Bill Kisliuk,
Are Two Securities Cases Better Than One?, RECORDER,July 14, 1997, at 1 (citing an estimate by
defense counsel that the cost of pretrial proceedings has increased by approximately 33% as
a result of dual-track litigation).
55. Super. Ct. No. CV758510 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1997) (on file with The Business
Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
56. The authors are aware of nine trial court rulings on whether state court discovery
should be stayed. The decisions are split. Goldman v. Filenet Corp., Case No. 773245 (Cal.
Super Ct., Orange County Jan. 20, 1998) (imposing stay) (on file with The Business Lawyer,
University of Maryland School of Law); Sperber v. Bixby (the "Brooktree Class Action"),
Case No. 699812 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County Oct. 18, 1996) (imposing stay) (on file
with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Ohrstrom, Jr. v. Harris
Trust Co., 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 1997) (imposing stay because it
would not prejudice the plaintiff and would result in savings to the defendant, without mention of the parallel federal action); Adler v. Prism Solutions, Inc., Case No. CV764547 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Santa Clara County May 27, 1997) (denying stay) (on file with The Business Lawyer,
University of Maryland School of Law); Werczberger v. Stormedia, Inc., No. CV760825
(Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County Dec. 31, 1996) (denying stay) (on file with The Business
Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); David S. Gilfand, Ltd. Profit Sharing Plan
v. Nutrition for Life Int'l, Inc. (Tex. Dist. Ct., Harris County Dec. 11, 1996) (denying stay)
(on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Lee v. IMP, Inc.,
CV 760793 (Cal Super. Ct., Santa Clara County Dec. 11, 1996) (denying stay) (on file with
The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Esner v. Szawlwinski, Case No.
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California trial courts, as in all other states, have the discretion to stay the
state case in favor of the parallel federal case. 57 The Oak Technology appellate court consolidated for review three separate cases in which the trial
court refused to stay discovery.58 Pursuant to a deferential standard of
review-abuse of discretion-the Oak Technology appellate court affirmed
59
the rulings by the lower courts.
In affirming the lower courts, the appellate court was swayed by its belief
that California state law affords plaintiffs broader relief than federal law,
including a private cause of action for aiding and abetting, as well as
punitive damages for some state fraud claims. 60 The court rejected the
defendants' arguments that a stay of the state court action would eliminate
duplicative litigation because all of the claims could be heard in federal
court through the use of pendent jurisdiction. 6 1 The court noted that
"[t]he underlying themes of these petitions is the view that real parties in
interest are circumventing the [PSLRA]," but found that "[t]he theme is
irrelevant to our analysis because the current state of the law permits
'6 2
securities fraud plaintiffs to maintain dual-track litigation.
Subsequent trial court decisions in California, however, have been more
restrictive in allowing state court discovery in dual-track cases. For example, on two occasions, a creative California state court judge allowed discovery but imposed an "ethical firewall" preventing its use in the federal
class action. 63 Notwithstanding these trial court developments, no appel978584 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco County Oct. 21, 1996) (denying stay) (on file with
The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Milano v. Auhll, No. SB 213
476 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Barbara County Oct. 2, 1996) (imposing stay, primarily because
case included a Securities Act claim) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland
School of Law).
57. See Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) ("[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the
cases on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel and for litigants.");
see also CAIFA Prof'l Law Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 15 Cal. App. 4th 800, 804
(Cal. App. Ct. May 7, 1993) ("It is black letter law that, when a federal action has been filed
covering the same subject matter as is involved in a California action, the California court
has the discretion but not the obligation to stay the state court action.").
58. Oak Technology, Super. Ct. No. CV7585 10.
59. Id. at 10-11.
60. Id. at 11-13 ("The bottom line is simply that it is rational to believe that real parties
in interest's state actions afford them broader relief, resolution of the federal actions will
therefore not resolve all the issues, so the state actions will proceed to decision in any event.").
61. Id. at 9. Petitioners unsuccessfully sought review by the California Supreme Court.
62. Id. at 8, 9.
63. See Ferrari v. Read-Rite Corp., Case No. CV762735 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara
CountyJan. 6, 1998) (order granting defendants' motion for creation of ethical wall) (on file
with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law) ("In order to preserve
defendants' rights under the PSLRA, and in accordance with principles of comity: ...Pursuant to this order, no attorney representing plaintiffs in this lawsuit may disclose any information obtained through discovery in this action to any attorney representing plaintiff in the
federal class action."); Howard Gunty, Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Quantum Corp., No.
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late court decision prevents the use of state litigation to avoid the federal
64
discovery stay.
Undermining of the Safe Harbor
A second problem raised by the migration to state court involves the
Reform Act's safe harbor for forward-looking statements. Issuers have
complained that they cannot take full advantage of the safe harbor provided by the Reform Act because they remain exposed to liability in state
court. In fact, preemption advocates consistently raised the absence of a
corresponding safe harbor in state court as a key argument. 65 It is difficult

to square potential state court liability for forward-looking statements with
Congress' purposes in enacting the safe harbor. At least in theory, if there
is no safe harbor in state court, the federal safe harbor provides little, if
any, comfort. More forward-looking information is likely to be disclosed
if state court causes of action based on failed forecasts are preempted. In
addition, as Congress found leading up to the Reform Act, class actions
based on a failed forecast, i.e., "fraud-by-hindsight" cases, are the most
prone to abuse. Accordingly, at least limited preemption of liability for
statements protected by the safe harbor was essential to ensure that issuers
did not lose the benefit of the safe harbor due to forum shopping by
66
plaintiffs.
CV760370 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County Oct. 16, 1997) (same) (on file with The
Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); see also Phyllis L. Mason, Is California's
Ethical Discovery FirewallHere to Stay?, DERIVATIVEs Lrric. REP.,Jan. 1, 1998, at 9 (discussing
these cases).
64. The Uniform Standards Act may not close this loophole because plaintiffs' lawyers
could still obtain discovery in parallel individual state actions. But see infra notes 160-64 and
accompanying text (discussing provision in Uniform Standards Act allowing federal judges
to stay discovery in parallel state cases).
65. See October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 50 (" [B] ecause of both the reality and the
threat of state court suits, high technology companies are reluctant to rely on the federal
safe harbor.") (statement of Robert Hinckley, Vice President, Xilinx Corp.); id. at 75 (" []he
conflicting state standards which govern private securities litigation fundamentally reduce a
corporation's willingness to provide any forward-looking information to the public.") (statement of Daniel Cooperman, General Counsel, Oracle Corp.); see also Written Testimony of
Bruce G. Vanyo Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and HazardousMaterials of the House Comm. on Commerce,
105th Cong. 5 (Oct. 21, 1997) ("As a result of plaintiffs' freely filing failed predictions cases
in state court, where there is no safe harbor protection, public companies cannot be expected
to make forward-looking statements, precisely contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the
safe harbor.") (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
66. This is especially so considering that the alternative protection afforded issuers by the
"bespeaks caution" doctrine may not apply in state court actions. The judicially created
"bespeaks caution" doctrine deems projections accompanied by adequate cautionary language immaterial as a matter of law. See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.,
7 E3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993). At least one state court has rejected the theory:
We recognize that 'the trend in [federal securities] law heavily favors' adopting the
bespeaks caution doctrine. We also recognize that adopting the doctrine may prevent
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WAS THE CALIFORNIA MIGRATION LIILY TO CONTINUE?
The concentration of state court litigation in California raises several
questions ignored by Congress in passing the Uniform Standards Act. With
such a disproportionate number of cases filed in California, it is fair to
ask why corporate issuers did not seek reform in Sacramento rather than
Washington. 67 Even more curious is why Congress acted so quickly to try
to pass the Uniform Standards Act, given that months before any bills
were introduced in Congress, a bill was introduced in the California legislature that would have imported the Reform Act provisions. 68 Passage
of the state bill would have mooted any need for federal legislation-if
the Reform Act applied in both federal and state fora, the incentive to
migrate to state court would have been eliminated. Other states have al69
ready taken this step.
Preemption proponents responded that if California adopted the Reform Act, the action would simply have shifted to one of the forty-nine
other states. 70 For several reasons, however, this argument is unconvincing.
Two factors, whose confluence is only present in California, account for
that state's popularity as a venue for class actions. 7 1 First, California

is home to a high percentage of high-technology companies,

72

the type

forum shopping between federal and state courts. Respondent, however, has not cited
and we have not found a state court that has applied the bespeaks caution doctrine to
dismiss state common law claims on the pleadings. We therefore conclude the district
court erred in dismissing appellants' state common law claims for failing to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Bondholder's Recovery Team v. St. Therese Home, Inc., No. C7-93-982, 1993 Minn. App.
LEXIS 1222, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 14,1993) (citation omitted). But see David v. Simware
Inc., No. 602143-96, 1997 N.Y Misc. LEXIS 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 13, 1997) (allowing
use of the bespeaks caution doctrine); Lagen v. Balcor Co., 653 N.E.2d 968 (Il1. App. Ct.
July 27, 1995) (same).
67. See 144 CONG. REc. H6059 (daily ed. July 21, 1998).
There are 65 [securities class actions] in California. If they [the proponents of the bill]
have got a problem in California, go to Sacramento. That is why we have State legislatures.... Why should we be voting on this? ... They come to Washington. I do not
get it. We do not have a problem in Massachusetts. By the way, none in Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Louisiana, across most of the country, no suits. What are we doing here?
Id. (statement of Rep. Edward Markey).
68. S. 35, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Ca. 1997) (introduced by Senator John Vasconcellos on
Dec. 2, 1996).
69. Arizona, Montana, and Ohio have passed such laws. ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 44-20812087 (1996); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 3-10-319 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.432.438 (1997).
70. The authors have had several conversations with congressional staffers on this point.
71. See Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State Detours,
39 ARiz. L. REV. 641, 678 (1997).
72. See Charles Leadbetter, Taking a Rich Slice of Silicon Pie, FIN. TIME"S,July 7, 1997, at 57
(stating that Silicon Valley alone is home to about 6000 high-technology companies, with
annual sales of approximately $200 billion).

14 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 54, November 1998

of issuer most frequently named in class actions. 73 In fact, the hightechnology industry led the lobbying effort for preemption.74 Second, California's blue sky law is unusual in that it appears to offer a fraud cause of
action not requiring proof of individualized reliance. 75 Elimination of this
requirement facilitates class actions because reliance ordinarily requires
individualized proof.
Although Congress did not discuss this issue during the Uniform Standards Act hearings, it is questionable whether nationwide class actions for
securities fraud may be brought under California state law. Federal constitutional law may limit California's ability to entertain national class actions. 76 Apart from constitutional limits, judicial interpretations may limit
the reach of the California statute most frequently invoked in securities
fraud class actions. Although enacted in 1968, 77 few cases interpret the
California blue sky laws. Pending California Supreme Court cases 78 will
soon clarify whether California state courts would have remained as an
73. See STANFORD STUDY, supra note 39, at iii ("High technology issuers continue to be
the most frequent target of class action litigation. High technology companies represent 34%
of all sued in federal court since the effective date of the Reform Act. That statistic is not
materially different from the pre-Reform Act experience.").
74. See Press Release, Lott Says Senate Will Act On "Uniform Standards" Bill Before Easter (Jan.
28, 1998) ("The high technology industry is the nation's largest creator of jobs-the engine
that is driving America's economic expansion ....
[1]n 1995 Congress passed securities litigation reform to ensure that high-tech companies continue their phenomenal growth and to
end abusive litigation. This bill will finish the job.") (on file with The Business Lawyer, University
of Maryland School of Law); October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 14-15 ("[C]lass actions
have had a considerable impact on Silicon Valley, which I ... represent. High technology
companies account for 34 percent of all the securities issuers sued last year.... It's ironic
that the very companies that have contributed disproportionately to the economic health of
our nation and have been a great source of wealth for investors are the very ones being
harassed. They are being penalized for success.") (statement of Rep. Anna Eshoo).
75. Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P2d 568, 579-80 (Cal. 1993) (noting in dicta that the
California blue sky provision does not require proof of reliance).
76. In order for California to apply its laws to non-residents, California must satisfy both
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of Article IV The U.S. Supreme Court has held that to satisfy these provisions in a class
action context, the forum state "must have a 'significant contact or significant aggregation
of contacts' to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class." Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,
312-13 (1981)). California courts have interpreted this requirement fairly liberally, requiring
only a significant contact that "appl[ies] generally to every class member's claims," without
requiring a showing that there are individual contacts to each class member. In re Computer
Memories Sec. Litig., Il1 ER.D. 675, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1986); see also Walker et al., supra note
71, at 682. Nonetheless, Phillips Petroleum presents a significant hurdle to the certification of
a national class in state court and likely deterred state filings pre-Reform Act. Other reasons
for the dearth of pre-Reform Act state court filings are the absence of the fraud-on-themarket presumption of reliance in most states and the potential for greater damages and fees
under federal law. Perino, supra note 4, at 284-85.
77. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25800 (West 1997).
78. See infra notes 86 & 88.
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alternative fora for securities class actions. The California blue sky provision most frequently relied upon has been section 25400(d) of the California Corporations Code. 79 Out of 44 securities class action complaints
filed in California state courts during 1996 and 1997, 41 (93%) allege
80
claims under section 25400(d).
Section 25400(d) raises the specter of a state equivalent to the federal
"fraud on the market" presumption, allowing for securities fraud class
actions without privity or actual reliance. 8 ' An interpretation from the
California Supreme Court allowing open-market fraud actions would be
a substantial departure for state blue sky law, which has traditionally concerned itself with fraud in privity, or near privity, situations. 82 There appear, however, to be at least two major impediments to asserting class
action claims in California under this provision: a limitation on the class
83
of persons who may be subject to suit, and a jurisdictional prerequisite.
The California Supreme Court has agreed to hear two cases which will
likely resolve these ambiguities, and should determine whether a nationwide class action can be brought under California law. 84 These decisions
will be important even after the Uniform Standards Act because of the
continued viability in state court of individual actions and class actions
not subject to preemption.
Section 25400(d) extends liability only to those who are engaged in
market activity, i.e., selling or offering securities for sale, or purchasing or
offering to purchase securities. 85 In a typical securities class action, the
issuer and certain of its officers and directors are sued for statements made
by them which affect the secondary market trading price of securities the
company has previously issued. Section 25400(d) would seem inapplicable
to this scenario unless the issuer is engaged in a securities offering at the
time of the alleged misstatement or omission, a relatively unusual occur-

79. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400(d).
80. Id. This provision, unique to California among state securities laws, provides:
It is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in this state: If such person is a
broker-dealer or other person selling or offering for sale or purchasing or offering to
purchase the security, to make, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such
security by others, any statement which was ... false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omitted to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, and which he knew or had reasonable grounds to believe was so false
or misleading.
Id.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id.
See, e.g., McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 96 ER.D. 357, 364 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86 & 88.
85. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400(d).
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rence. The California Supreme Court has agreed to review who can be
86
defendants under section 25400(d).
Section 25400(d) also contains a jurisdictional prerequisite that may
preclude nationwide class actions. The section mandates that the defendant's offer or sale take place "in this state." ' 87 Whether the "in this state"
clause prohibits redress under the California blue sky laws for nonresidents should be answered by the California Supreme Court sometime
this year. 88
Congress, however, did not wait for judicial developments. A powerful
constituency demanded that Congress protect it from the law of one state
because it believed that it could not secure protection from the more obvious source-Sacramento. 89 If Congress had waited just a few months
before passing the Uniform Standards Act, the California Supreme Court
might have eliminated the need for the statute by ending the migration of
securities class actions to state court, at least in California. Thus, the authors question whether the "migration" to state court was more than just
a temporary sojourn.
A more substantial justification for preemption builds upon principles
underlying the passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement
Act of 1996 (NSMIA).9° NSMIA preempted most state regulation governing the offering of securities by issuers whose securities are nationally
traded. Some proponents of the Uniform Standards Act believe that preemption of state anti-fraud class actions is a logical extension of NSMIA. 9 1
In their view, securities trading on national markets-such as the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
System/National Market System (NASDAQ)-should be governed by a
uniform national fraud standard.9 2 Accordingly, fraud standards should
not be subject to the geographical happenstance of where a corporation
is headquartered or incorporated or where a purchaser of securities lives.
A single uniform standard protects corporations from being exposed to
disparate standards in state courts when the companies have turned to the
national capital markets for financing. This uniform standard justification
does not turn on whether the migration was a lasting phenomenon or not.

86. StorMedia, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, No. CV760825 (Cal.
July 7, 1997) (petition for review).
87. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25400(d).
88. Pass v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., No. H016376, at 2 (Cal. Jan. 27, 1997) (petition for review).
89. October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 20 (statement of Robert Hinkley).
90. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
91. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 4, at 321 (arguing that nationally traded securities should
be governed by a uniform set of federal standards).
92. Id. at 324-25.
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Interest group pressures, however, feed off of tangible phenomena, not
theories. Although uniformity may offer a theory justifying preemption,
the migration to California state court provided the hard evidence. Thus,
93
while Kansas is generally credited with beginning state blue sky laws,
California may be credited with their demise.
THE UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT
The Uniform Standards Act differs substantially from the bills originally
introduced in Congress to preempt state securities class actions. A review
of the legislative history from introduction to adoption provides important
insights into the choices made by Congress and the purposes animating
the statute as enacted.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
The path leading to the enactment of the Uniform Standards Act began
with the introduction of two bills in the House of Representatives and one
95
94
in the Senate. The original bills were House Bill 1653, House Bill 1689,
and Senate Bill 1260.96 House Bill 1653, which would have preempted all
private state anti-fraud actions, quickly fell by the wayside. This left House
Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260, which only preempted class actions, to
97
work their way through Congress.
House Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260 shared a number of features.
Both bills preempted all class actions under state law whether brought in
state or federal court. Preemption reaches any suit:
based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision
thereof... by any private party alleging-(1) an untrue statement or
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale
of a covered security; or (2) that the defendant used or employed any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with
the purchase or sale of a covered security.98
Thus, while the language is not identical, both bills provided for essentially
the same broad reach as the general federal anti-fraud proscription found
in Rule I Ob-5 under the Exchange Act. 99 The scope of preemption, however, is limited to "class actions."
93. THOMAs LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 367 (2d ed. 1990)

(noting that Kansas adopted the first blue sky law in 1911).
94. H.R. 1653, 105th Cong. (1997).
95. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1998).
96. S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1998).
97. The bills and the Uniform Standards Act explicitly do not preempt enforcement
actions brought by state regulators.
98. See H.R. 1689 § 2(a)(1) (proposing to add Securities Act § 16(b)); S. 1260 § 101(a)(1)
(same).
99. See 17 C.ER. § 240.1Ob-5 (1998).
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Preemption of "'ClassActions"
Early versions of both House Bill 1689 and Senate Bill 1260 relied on
a unique definition of "class action" that does not mirror the definition
found in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 23) (which
has been followed by most state civil procedure codes). 100 Both bills contained multiple, overlapping definitions, suggesting that Congress was concerned that enterprising plaintiffs' lawyers would find a way to evade preemption. The original bills defined "class action" as follows:
[A]ny single lawsuit, or any group of lawsuits filed in or pending in
the same court involving common questions of law or fact, in
which-(A) damages are sought on behalf of more than 25 persons;
(B) one or more named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties
similarly situated; or (C) one or more of the parties seeking to recover
damages did not personally authorize the filing of the lawsuit. 101
Unlike Rule 23, the bills' definition offers judges very little discretion in
the class action determination-questions of numerosity and adequacy
are eliminated, leaving the judge to decide only whether there are common
questions of law or fact. The motivation for this bright line definition of
class action was the drafters' belief that it would afford issuers greater
certainty.
The definition was substantially revised by the time it was enacted. The
Uniform Standards Act uses the term "covered class action" and defines
it as follows:
(i) any single lawsuit in which-(J) damages are sought on behalf of
more than 50 persons or prospective class members, and questions
of law or fact common to those persons or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an
alleged misstatement or omission, predominate over any questions
affecting only individual persons or members; or (II) one or more
named parties seek to recover damages on a representative basis on
behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated,
and questions of law or fact common to those persons or members
of the prospective class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual persons or members; or (ii) any group of lawsuits filed in
or pending in the same court and involving common questions of
law or fact, in which-(I) damages are sought on behalf of more than

100. H.R. 1689 § 2(a)(1) (proposing to create Securities Act § 16()(2)); S. 1260 § 101(a)(1)
(same).
101. See H.R. 1689 § 2(a)(1) (May 21, 1997) (proposing to add Securities Act § 16(d)(1));
S. 1260 (Oct. 7, 1997) (same).
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50 persons; and (11) the lawsuits are joined, consolidated, or otherwise
proceed as a single action for any purpose. 102
The twenty-five person threshold was raised at the request of the
SEC.' 0 3 The Commission was concerned about situations-not infrequent-in which a broker or investment adviser defrauds a client base of
more than twenty-five. 104 Preempting state law in this situation would eliminate a number of important rights and remedies-including agency law
duties and punitive damages-necessary and appropriate in the context
of a face-to-face transaction between a broker or adviser and her client.
The number chosen-fifty-is somewhat arbitrary and remains well below
the ordinary numerosity requirements for class actions.10 5 It will be interesting to see if the fifty person threshold influences judges in the future in
making numerosity determinations in class actions, or whether the definition will be limited to the Uniform Standards Act. The appearance in
the final bill of the word "covered" as a modifier to "class action" would
appear to indicate that Congress does not intend for the definition to be
applied in other areas. The increase to fifty makes the definition less intrusive on what is predominantly a state law concern-face-to-face transactions within one state.
The common questions of law or fact clause was also fine-tuned. It
originally omitted any mention of predominance (required for a class action under Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)). 10 6 The revised clause
preempts cases where "questions of law or fact common to those persons
or members of the prospective class, without reference to issues of individualized reliance on an alleged misstatement or omission, predominate
over any questions affecting only individual persons or members ....,,107
The SEC was concerned that without a predominance requirement it
102. Securities Act § 16(l)(2)(A) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p()(2)(A)).
103. See Hearing Concerning H.R. 1689, The "Securities Litigation Uniform StandardsAct of 1997,"
Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and HazardousMaterials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong.
9 (May 19, 1998) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter May 19 Levitt
Testimony].
104. Id. at 4 ("Regulated persons, such as brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, who
perpetrate frauds on their clients should remain subject to suit in state court where stricter
sanctions may be available. These frauds, including Ponzi schemes and pyramid transactions,
may be perpetrated on multiple clients. A 25 person threshold is too low and may force
many of these types of cases into federal court.").
105. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc. [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 94,733, at 93,961 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1989) (refusing to certify a
class of 120 plaintiffs on numerosity grounds); Stoudt v. E.F Hutton & Co., 121 ER.D. 36,
38 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (234 plaintiffs); Steinmetz v. Bache & Co., 71 ER.D. 202,204 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (185 plaintiffs).
106. Most, if not all, securities class actions are brought pursuant to that rule. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); see also 7B WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1781 (1986) (Rule 23(b)(3) is "used quite frequently in cases involving securities frauds.").
107. Securities Act § 16(t)(2)(A)(i)(II) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p()(2)(A)(i)(IJ)).

20

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 54, November 1998

would be too easy to sweep together separately filed actions involving a
single common question of law or fact. 10 8 For example, under the original
definition defendants would have been able to group a contract action and
a fraud action if there were any common question between them. The
predominance requirement eliminates this possibility. The predominance
requirement does not include, however, common questions of reliance.
Requiring a common question of reliance would mean that the Uniform
Standards Act would preempt very little because the fraud-on-the-market
presumption is generally not available in state court actions. Many courts
have held that individualized questions of reliance necessarily outweigh
common questions in state-law fraud actions, making it difficult to certify
a class action.10 9
Note also that the original bills applied to any "single lawsuit or group
of lawsuits."" l0 The version finally adopted in the Uniform Standards Act
omits "group of lawsuits" in this portion of the definition. The grouping
provision is now found in a separate subsection. "' There is no requirement
that common questions predominate in these individual cases, but in order
for the provision to apply, the judge must first combine the actions in some
fashion. An action filed in state court will be preempted only if forty-nine
others are filed in the same state court and combined. This grouping
provision was added out of fear that the plaintiffs' bar would disaggregate
a class action by filing multiple, identical individual actions in state court
12
(similar to "mass actions" filed by the plaintiffs bar in mass tort cases)."
The threat of disaggregation of a class action into multiple lawsuits was
probably remote. Unlike a mass tort in which each individual suffers significant bodily injuries and probably has a sufficient claim to make disaggregation profitable,' ' 3 individual claims are typically small in securities
fraud.
Congress left certain interpretive questions for the courts. For example,
what is meant by "same court"? Does it mean courts of the same state,
county, or before the same judge? In the authors' view, the only rational
answer is the same state, as the assignment of judges is fortuitous, and if
the standard were the same county, plaintiffs would be able to easily avoid

108. See May 19 Levitt Testimony, supra note 103, at 4.
109. See, e.g., Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 ER.D. 403, 412 (N.D. Ill. 1987). Because proof
of actual reliance is necessary, "common law claims... do not lend themselves to class action
treatment." Id.

110. See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 2 (proposing to create Securities Act § 16(0(3)); S. 1260,
105th Cong. § 101(a)(l) (same).

11l.Securities Act § 16(f)(2)(A)(ii) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(0(2)(A)(ii)).
112. Statement of Managers, supra note 3.
113. See Michael A. Perino, ClassAction Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of OptOut Right in Mass 7brt
Class Actions, 46 EMORY LJ.85 (1997) (arguing that opt-out rights in
mass tort actions, such as those involving claims stemming from cigarette smoking or asbestos
exposure, can frustrate resolution of the case).
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preemption. Potential problems with the grouping provision also lurk in
the background. What is meant by the ambiguous phrase "otherwise proceed as a single action for any purpose"? Does the taking of joint discovery
suffice? Standing alone it would seem that the answer should be yes, but
this question is complicated by Congress' decision to grant federal judges
the power to stay discovery in state securities actions. This stay power is
limited, however, as federal judges probably do not have the authority to
stay state court discovery if a federal action has not yet been filed. 114 This
limitation counsels in favor of grouping cases that have been consolidated
for purposes of discovery.
An additional subsection of the definition of "class action," which preempts cases where damages are sought by "one or more named parties
...on behalf of themselves and other unnamed parties similarly situated,"
made it from the original bills into the Uniform Standards Act largely
untouched.' 1 5 The sole exception is the inclusion of language requiring
that common questions predominate. In what appears to be a drafting
oversight, this subsection does not except consideration of individual issues
of reliance as subsection (1) does.1 16 To avoid unnecessary litigation, Congress should draft a technical correction. This subsection is likely to have
greater impact than subsection (I) because it is impossible to know at the
time of filing how many members there might be in the plaintiff class.
That number will depend on opt-outs from the class action, an unknown
variable at the time of filing.
A provision in the original bills, defining as a class action a suit in which
''one or more of the parties seeking to recover damages did not personally
authorize the filing of the lawsuit,""' 7 was omitted from the Uniform
Standards Act at the urging of the SEC. 118 That provision was problematic
because it covers nothing intended to be preempted that is not already
covered by the other definitions, but it inadvertently would have preempted
suits by guardians on behalf of minors, trustees on behalf of trust beneficiaries, and other representative relationships in which there was no record of abuse.
A provision was added to clarify the scope of the class action definition:
"a corporation, investment company, pension plan, partnership, or other
entity shall be treated as one person or prospective class member" so long
as the entity was "not established for the purpose of participating in the
action." 119

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See infra text accompanying notes 160-64.
Securities Act § 16(f(2)(A)(i)(II) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(0(2)(A)(i)(II)).
Id.
See H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 2 (proposing to create Securities Act § 16(d)(1)(C)).
See May 19 Levitt Testimony, supra note 103, at 4.
Securities Act § 16(0(2)(C) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(0(2)(C)).
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Limitation to Nationally Traded Securities
The preemption of the Uniform Standards Act is limited in another
important way--it reaches only "covered securities." 120 This definition
relies on provisions added to the Securities Act by NSMIA. Section 18(b)(1)
of the Securities Act preempts state registration for "nationally traded
securities," defined as securities "listed, or authorized for listing, on the
[NYSE], or the [AMEX], or listed on the [NASDAQ]" or "a security of
the same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is a senior security" of
the same issuer who has a security listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ.2 1 The Uniform Standards Act adds preemption of state anti-fraud
class actions to NSMIAs preemption of state registration requirements. 22
If the issuer has any securities listed on a national trading market, all of
its securities equal or senior to that listed security are exempt from state
anti-fraud class actions. This captures debt within the scope of preemption. 123 For example, if a company has its stock listed for trading on the
NYSE, its unlisted debt would also be exempt. Issuers whose securities are
not listed on national markets, however,-primarily micro-cap and penny
24
stock issuers-remain subject to state actions.1
An early version of House Bill 1689 would have preempted all securities
class actions against an issuer if it had any covered securities. 125 The Uniform Standards Act adopts the Senate's narrower approach, preempting
only those actions involving listed or senior securities. 126 The Senate version also included securities of investment companies as a covered security.127 The House version's failure to cover investment companies created
an anomaly, as closed-end mutual funds are covered because they are
traded over exchanges, while open-end mutual funds were left subject to
state class actions. This anomaly was eliminated by the Conference Committee,128 thus eliminating potential worry for investment companies.
In response to a criticism by Professor John Coffee that the covered
security definition was potentially overbroad, 129 the Uniform Standards
Act also excludes debt securities issued in a private placement from the
definition. Professor Coffee pointed out that these securities issuances are
120. Id. § 16(0(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p()(3)).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (Supp. 11 1996). The provision also allows the SEC to add other
exchanges to this list by rule.
122. Exchange Act § 28(0(2) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(l)(2)).
123. But see infra notes 129-33 and accompany text (discussing exclusion for debt issued in
private placements).
124. See October 29 Hearing, supra note 14.
125. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 2 (proposing to create Securities Act § 16 (d)(2)).
126. Securities Act §16(0(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(l)(3)).
127. S. 1260, 105th Cong. (1998).
128. Securities Act § 16(0(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(0(3)).
129. Hearing on H.R. 1689 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous Materials of the House
Commerce Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Professor John Coffee, Columbia Law
School).
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governed by private placement agreements containing numerous warran30
ties and covenants, the breach of which gives rise to a contract claim. 1
The definition is curiously phrased, however, in that it excludes only debt
securities "exempt from registration under this title pursuant to rules issued
by the Commission under section 4(2)" of the Securities Act. 13 1 By its
terms the definition would not apply to debt securities relying on a private
placement exemption directly under section 4(2). Therefore, only issuers
relying on Rule 506 under Regulation D would be excluded. 132 The same
133
approach is taken in NSMIA.
A related carve-out further limits the preemptive reach of the Uniform
Standards Act. In response to another concern raised by Professor Coffee,
the Uniform Standards Act excludes from its reach any class action "that
seeks to enforce a contractual agreement between an issuer and an indenture trustee" if brought by "a party to the agreement or a successor to
such party."' 134 Such claims sound more in contract than in fraud, even if
misstatements are alleged, and state courts are the appropriate forum for
these contractual claims.
The Delaware Carve-Out
Another change to the bills in response to concerns of the SEC and
others was the so-called "Delaware carve-out." 135 The original bills would
have had the unintended effect of preempting a substantial body of state
corporate law. The distinction between state corporate law and federal
36
securities law has been zealously guarded by the U.S. Supreme Court
and generally respected by Congress and the SEC. The overall definition
of class action was revised to explicitly exclude "an exclusively derivative
137
action brought by 1 or more shareholders on behalf of a corporation."'
Derivative actions, of course, are the primary enforcement vehicle available for most corporate law duties, traditionally the province of state
courts.
Other corporate law duties, however, required a more carefully tailored
carve-out. Under state corporate law, issuers and their officers and directors generally owe a duty of disclosure to their shareholders as one element
of their fiduciary duties. 138 That duty of disclosure requires the issuer and
130. Id.
131. Securities Act § 16(l)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p()( 3 )).
132. 17 CER. § 230.506 (1998).
133. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3417 (1996).
134. Exchange Act § 28(O(3)(C) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(C)).
135. Securities Act § 16(d)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(1)).
136. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
137. Securities Act § 16(l)(2)(B) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(1)(2)(B)).
138. See generally Lawrence Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The CorporateDirector's
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996). Professor Hamermesh assisted in
the drafting of the Delaware carve-out.
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39
its managers to speak truthfully when soliciting action by shareholders. 1
Even though the corporate law duty of disclosure significantly overlaps
with the coverage of federal securities law, actions based on corporate duty
of disclosure were not considered to be part of the problem that the Uniform Standards Act was intended to address. Claims based on the breach
of this duty typically arise out of mergers, tender offers, and other extraordinary corporate transactions. These claims are either individual,
rather than derivative, or both because they involve the voting rights of
shareholders or other rights of the individual, even though they may have
an effect on the corporation as a whole. These claims are routinely litigated
in state courts, most notably the Delaware Court of Chancery (Chancery
Court). The Chancery Court, with its steady diet of corporate claims, has
developed expertise in this area that the federal courts are unlikely to
match. In addition, the Delaware courts can resolve these claims within
days rather than months, an important consideration if a merger is pending.
In order to preserve these advantages of state law, a provision was
drafted by an ad hoc committee led by then-SEC General Counsel Richard H. Walker and consisting of certain members of the American Bar
Association's Task Force on Securities Reform and the Delaware bar, as
well as academics and SEC staff.140 This effort had widespread support,
including that of corporate issuers, who were interested in maintaining
the predictability offered by Delaware corporate law.'14 The preliminary
approach taken was to limit the scope of preemption to transactions effected over national markets. This approach would have excluded mergers,
stock buybacks, and tender offers, as these transactions are typically completed through the force of state law or an escrow agent. Such an approach
also would have excluded most public offerings, however, which proponents deemed essential to preemption. Accordingly, a carve-out from the
general scope of preemption was adopted instead.
The carve-out contains two prongs. Subsection (A) preserves state jurisdiction for breach of fiduciary duty claims arising from transactions taking
place between the issuer and its security holders. 142 These include: (i) repurchases of securities by the issuer from its security holders, i.e., "buybacks"; (ii) reorganizations, such as the exchange by the issuer of one class
of securities for another; and (iii) offerings of additional securities solely
to existing shareholders, i.e., "rights offerings." Subsection (B) preserves
state jurisdiction for breach of fiduciary duty claims arising from an issuer's
recommendation, position, or other communication concerning three

139. Id. at 1105.
140. See Rachel Witmer, Special Report: SEC, PrivateBar Working to Address Flaw in Litigation
Reform Bills, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 169 (Jan. 30, 1998).
141. Id.
142. Id.

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act

25

other types of corporate transactions: (i) mergers and other corporate
transactions requiring shareholder approval; (ii) tender offers; and (iii) situations where majority shareholders force minority shareholders to relinquish their shares, i.e., "freeze-outs." Both prongs extend to misstatements
made by affiliates, so issuers cannot insulate themselves from liability by
directing misleading disclosure through its parent, subsidiary, controlling
shareholder, or an underwriter.
Both provisions are limited to actions "based upon the statutory or
common law of the State in which the issuer is incorporated ...or organized." 143 This limitation gives the issuer control over its litigation exposure because of its ability to choose its state of incorporation. The
Senate legislative history suggests plaintiffs are expected to file these cases
in the defendant's state of incorporation 144 and the Conference Committee Report repeats the suggestion. 145 Limiting claims against Delaware
corporations to the Chancery Court would help maintain the uniformity
and predictability of Delaware corporate law. The legislative history does
not explain, however, what would happen if the plaintiff wanted to file its
state claim pendent to a federal claim in federal court. 146 Could those
claims only be filed in a federal court sitting in the issuer's state of incorporation? Such a conclusion would be simultaneously costly for distant
plaintiffs and lucrative for Delaware local counsel, but the text of the
provision does not support this jurisdiction-stripping interpretation. The
legislative history sweeps too broadly-the Uniform Standards Act does
not prevent plaintiffs from maintaining pendent claims in any federal court
that has venue.
The Delaware carve-out, while clearly necessary to preserve state corporate law, creates at least one unavoidable problem: it re-opens the "reverse auction" problem for class action settlements. The "reverse auction"
problem was created by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Matsushita
Electric IndustrialCo. v. Epstein.147 In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a state court class action settlement, which released both state law
claims and federal securities claims pending in a parallel federal suit, had
a preclusive effect on the federal claims.148 The state court judgment pre143. Id.
144. Statement of Managers, supra note 3, at n.2 ("[f]he Committee expressly does not
intend for suits excepted under this provision to be brought in venues other than in the
issuer's state of incorporation, in the case of a corporation, or state of organization, in the
case of any other entity.").
145. H.R.CoNF. REP. No. 105-803, at 2 n.2 ("It is the intention of the managers that
the suits under this exception be limited to the state in which issuer [sic] of the security is
incorporated in the case of a corporation, or state of organization, in the case of any other
entity.").
146. Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the Exchange
Act and the Williams Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994).
147. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
148. Id. at 374.
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cluded the federal claims notwithstanding the federal court's exclusive ju49
risdiction over the federal securities claims. 1
Matsushita raises the possibility that defendants will be able to minimize
their liability exposure through a "reverse auction," offering to settle
50
claims against them with the plaintiffs' lawyer who offers the lowest bid. 1
This result obviously threatens the interests of the plaintiff class, which
could have its claims sold out on the cheap. On remand in Matsushita, the
Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs' lawyers in the state case had in fact
settled the federal claims for less than they were worth. 151 This inadequate
representation meant that the state court judgment was not entitled to
52
preclusive effect. 1
The Uniform Standards Act reduces the potential for a "reverse auction." By eliminating parallel state securities class actions, the Uniform
Standards Act lessens the chances for a collusive settlement between defendants and a faithless plaintiffs' lawyer. The Uniform Standards Act does
not, however, eliminate this problem entirely. The Delaware carve-out and
the exclusion for derivative claims allow some parallel state actions to
continue. Federal securities claims can be settled in those state cases, even
though they cannot be litigated on the merits in state court because of
exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus, the Matsushitareverse auction problem
persists in that category of cases. Defendants will still be able to run "reverse auctions" when state cases have been filed, pitting state court plaintiffs against federal court plaintiffs.
Extension of the Discovery Stay to State Court
The limitation of preemption to class actions creates an obvious loophole in the Reform Act's discovery stay provision. The plaintiffs' lawyers
would still be free to bring a federal class action and a parallel state action
on behalf of an individual who would otherwise be a member of the class.
Discovery obtained in the state individual action could then be used to
bolster the complaint in the federal class action.
Sponsors of Senate Bill 1260 and House Bill 1689 initially suggested
that they believed preemption of state class actions would end the use of
state court for discovery.' 53 The issuer community, too, evidently did not
believe that the discovery stay loophole presented a substantial concern.
149. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
150. See generallyJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. Riv. 1343, 1370-72 (1995).
151. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 E3d 1235, 1250 (9th Cir. 1997).
152. Id. at 1250-54.
153. October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 18 ("Because of the shift to state courts, the stay
of discovery is not in place. This means the threat of huge level costs remains and the
incentive to settle meritless cases continues. It is this undermining of the federal law that
prompted Representative White and I to introduce this bill.") (statement of Rep. Anna
Eshoo).
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Although representatives of this community testified that they were severely burdened by parallel federal and state suits, none pointed out the
possible loophole as a problem during the legislative hearings. Rather, their
testimony left the impression that they believed the problem would be
solved by preempting state class actions. 154 The problem posed by individual actions could be minimized if claims were small enough that defendants could simply pay the damages demanded in the complaints rather
than litigating. If this strategy proved ineffective, issuers apparently believed that state court judges would stay discovery in favor of the federal
suit given the small number of plaintiffs (necessarily less than fifty under
the Uniform Standards Act's grouping provision) in the state court case.
In seeking a more effective solution to the discovery stay problem, a
conundrum arises. The obvious solution would be to preempt all securities
actions, not just class actions. This was the approach taken by House Bill
1653.155 Preempting all state securities actions, however, comes at an unacceptable cost. As the Commission made clear in its Senate testimony,
state law provides individuals important protections in investors' relationships with their brokers and advisers, including the availability of punitive
damages in cases of egregious fraud. 156 In addition, preemption of individual actions would pose an even greater threat to principles of federalism. Investors defrauded in local transactions would be precluded from

suing in state court under state law, even though the state interest would
likely outweigh the federal interest in such cases. 157 Moreover, forcing all
actions, rather than just class actions, to be brought in federal court would
exacerbate the problem of overly crowded federal dockets. 158 In any event,
preemption of all actions probably would not have stopped circumvention
154. See, e.g., id. at 51 (discussing the problem of parallel federal and state suits at length,
then urging Congress to adopt Senate Bill 1260) (statement of Robert C. Hinkley, Vice
President, Xilinx Corp.).
155. H.R. 1653 § 2(b) (1997).
156. October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 17 (statement of SEC).
157. Id.at 29.
158. OnJanuary 1, 1998, William H. Rehnquist, ChiefJustice of the U.S. Supreme Court
released "The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary." Preemption exacerbates the
central problem facing federal courts flagged in the report:
Fiscal Year 1997 saw courts of appeals and bankruptcy filings at their highest rates in
history. District courts also were very busy... Many factors have produced this upward
spiral, including ...large class-action litigation.... Unless steps are taken to stop or
reverse this trend, either the demands placed on the federal judiciary will eventually
outstrip its resources, or the judiciary will become so large that it will lose its traditional
character as a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction.
William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 4 (Jan. 1, 1998)
(on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); see also Brigid
McMenamin, Un-NaturalJustice,FORBES, May 5, 1997, at 122 ("Federal judges are swamped,
right now facing, on average, 416 civil cases each, nearly 23% more than in 1990. Last year
the number of suits filed in federal courts was up 8%,from 248,335 in 1995 to 269,132 in
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of the federal discovery stay. The plaintiffs would still be left with certain
options, including state court derivative actions and state inspection statutes. 159
Congress found a less objectionable solution to this problem. House Bill
1689 was amended to include the following provision designed to eliminate
the use of state court actions as a vehicle for discovery for use in federal
actions:
Circumvention of stay of discovery-Upon a proper showing, a
court may stay discovery proceedings in any private action in a State
court as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate
its judgments, in an action subject to a stay of discovery pursuant to
60
this section. 1
16 1
This provision was incorporated into the Uniform Standards Act.
As written, the stay gives federal judges broad discretion in staying state
discovery. Appellate judges will find it necessary to provide some guidelines for the use of the stay in order to avoid unwarranted intrusion into
state proceedings. The language "as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or
to protect or effectuate its judgments" tracks that found in the AntiInjunction Act. 162 Courts are likely to look there for guidance. If they do,
they should be unlikely to enjoin state discovery based on an anticipated
but unfiled federal action.1 63 The language of the provision reinforces the

1996.... Overwhelmed, the judiciary is begging Congress for 55 newjudges."). The authors
do not mean to suggest that the Uniform Standards Act will cause an increase in federal
cases of dramatic proportions. Preemption, however, clearly will result in the addition of at
least some complex securities class actions to federal dockets. Preempting individual actions
as well would have multiplied the problem exponentially.
159. Inspection statutes under state corporate law may give shareholders an effective
discovery tool for securities fraud class actions:
Shareholders seeking to uncover suspected wrongdoing by corporate management have
a statutory right under Delaware's corporate inspection statute to examine the company's "books and records." At a minimum, the "books and records" of a corporation
include: corporate accounting records; minutes of all meetings of the shareholders,
board of directors, and board committees; records of actions taken by written consent

of the shareholders or board of directors; stocklist materials; the corporation's certificate
of incorporation; corporate bylaws; written communications to shareholders; and
copies of resolutions creating one or more classes of stock. "Book and records" may
also include documents relating to allegedly wrongful transactions.
Randall S. Thomas and KennethJ. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutesfor Discovery in Federal
Securities FraudActions, 77 B.U. L. REV. 69, 84 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
160. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 101(a)(2) (1998) (proposing to create Securities Act
§ 27(b)(4)).
161. Securities Act § 27(b)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(b)(4)).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994).
163. See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
"district court was obliged to ascertain, at least in a preliminary fashion, its own subject

matter jurisdiction ... before issuing an injunction in aid of that jurisdiction").
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conclusion, as it is limited to "an action subject to a stay of discovery"
which suggests that a federal action must already be filed.
If the provision does not apply to cases in which a federal action has
not yet been filed, it may not completely close the discovery stay loophole.
The plaintiffs may seek to avoid the provision by filing the state action
first, making discovery demands, and then filing the federal action within
364 days after the state filing. This strategy, however, may be difficult to
implement. The plaintiffs' lawyers who file only in state court may find
themselves displaced as lead counsel in the subsequent federal action if a
rival plaintiffs' lawyer brings a federal action first.
The vagueness of a "proper showing" raises a number of questions
about the interpretation of this new discovery stay provision. When should
a federal judge stay discovery? Is a "proper showing" made when the same
law firm appears for the plaintiffs in both the state and federal case? It
would seem that a stay would be required in these circumstances to protect
the stay in federal court. Should the federal judge stay state discovery when
the complaints are based on the same or similar allegations, but the lawyers
are different? Under these circumstances, the authors believe that a stay
would be justified unless the lawyer in the state case signed an affidavit
promising not to share discovery with the lawyer in the federal case. 164
Will simply having the same defendants in both suits suffice to justify a
stay? Probably not, absent some showing of a relationship between the
state and federal plaintiffs or their lawyers. The defendants might be justified, however, in moving for a protective order barring disclosure of the
discovery in the state case. If the state court refused the protective order,
the federal judge would then be justified in issuing a stay. Does the size of
the state plaintiff's loss matter? A small amount of damages sought relative
to the expense of the lawsuit suggests that the suit may have been brought
primarily to seek discovery.
Another question arises from the carve-outs in the Uniform Standards
Act. Is it ever appropriate to stay discovery in a state court derivative action
or a direct action brought under the Delaware carve-out? Staying discovery would frustrate the purpose of those carve-outs. Finally, there are timing questions. What happens when a federal judge, who previously stayed
state court discovery, grants a motion to dismiss the federal complaint with
leave to amend? Does discovery then proceed in the state action which
can be used in amending the federal complaint? Allowing discovery, particularly when the federal complaint has already been determined to be
inadequate, would appear to undermine the purpose of the stay. On the
other hand, if the federal action has been dismissed without leave to
amend, there seems to be no rational basis for postponing discovery in the
state proceeding, and there would no longer be the requisite "action subject to a stay of discovery."
164. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Cf Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 288
E2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that a federal court can enjoin the use of federal
discovery in a state case).
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State Government and Pension Plan Carve-Out
State governmental authorities were generally opposed to the Uniform
Standards Act.' 65 Nonetheless, a separate carve-out benefitting state governments and pension funds came as a surprise, as the hearings were silent
on the need for such an exception. Senator Paul Sarbanes offered this
provision as a floor amendment. The amendment provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, nothing in this
section may be construed to preclude a State or political subdivision
thereof or a State pension plan from bringing an action involving a
covered security on its own behalf, or as a member of a class comprised solely of other States, political subdivisions, or State pension
plans that are named plaintiffs, and that have authorized participa166
tion, in such action.
The practical effect of the amendment is that it will save actions by
state entities from being preempted as class actions under the grouping
provision. Even without this amendment, state entities were free to sue in
state court where they would only count as one investor for purposes of
the preemption threshold. With the amendment, state entities may not be
grouped with any other plaintiff (state entity or not) for purposes of counting to fifty.16 7 The primary situation in which saving state-entity class actions from preemption is likely to apply is when a state allows certain
political subdivisions such as school districts, counties, or cities to invest in
pools created by larger political subdivisions. If the central fund is defrauded, these smaller jurisdictions may band together to sue as a class
not subject to preemption. The policy basis for the Sarbanes amendment
is that state taxpayers may be required to make up losses that these entities
cannot cover. 168 In practice, the amendment is unlikely to be invoked with
any frequency as most state entities will find it cheaper to participate in a
broader-based federal class action. Only when state law confers substantial
advantages will it make sense for state entities to opt for their own class
action.
Despite the Sarbanes amendment's limited practical effect, it generated
considerable opposition in the House. Critics of the amendment argued
165. See News Release, New York State and Local Finance Officials Ask Senator D'Amato
to Oppose Securities Law Preemption Efforts (Oct. 6, 1997) (announcing that 104 state and
local public finance officials from New York signed a letter of opposition) (on file with The
Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
166. Securities Act § 16(d)(2)(A) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(2)(A)).
167. See id.
168. See Federal Securities Preemption, NATION'S CITIES WEEKLY, May 18, 1998, at 3-4. ("If
defrauded state or local pension funds were barred from recovering from corporate wrongdoers in state court.., the state or city and its taxpayers may be stuck with making up losses
in the fund. Not only would this jeopardize general revenue, leading to a likely loss of jobs
and services to the public, but it could also severely damage a jurisdiction's credit rating.").
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that the provision would give plaintiffs' lawyers a new line of business
representing classes of state pension plans, thus creating a new class of
professional plaintiffs from the ranks of state government. 169 Recent allegations that plaintiffs' lawyers were making campaign contributions in
exchange for being selected as class counsel by state pension plans lends
credibility to this criticism. 170 Moreover, the critics alleged that the amendment would undermine the effect of the lead plaintiff provision by encouraging state entities to proceed in state court. 171 In the end, however,
these criticisms failed to carry the day and the House acquiesced in the
measure, but only after adding a provision requiring that the state entities
affirmatively opt-in to the class. 172 This provison should limit the ability
of plaintiffs' lawyers to assemble classes of compliant pension funds.
Removal Provision
The Uniform Standards Act allows the defendant to remove covered
class actions to federal court. 'Any covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall
be removable to the Federal district court for the district in which the
73
action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b).' 1
The provision is unusual in that it allows actions to be removed to federal
court even though they are preempted by the Uniform Standards Act.
That is, it allows for removal of actions so that they can be dismissed in
federal court. Ordinarily, one would expect the law to require the defendant to bring its motion to dismiss or demurrer in state court. Indeed, the
Uniform Standards Act appears to strip the state court of subject matter
jurisdiction and thus, the state court should dismiss the case on its own
motion. The removal provision, however, not only allows federal courts to
interpret the scope of preemption, it also brings in the Reform Act's stay
of discovery. 174 Some state court rules would allow discovery while a motion to dismiss was pending, thus forcing the defendant to seek a discretionary stay from the state court, or an injunction against discovery

169. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: Hearing on H.R. 1689 Before the Subcomm. on
Finance and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 9 (1998) ("I also

am concerned that a clever plaintiff's lawyer may use this exception to vitiate the core
protective measures established in the PSLRA .... ) (statement ofJohn E Olson) [hereinafter
Olson Testimony].
170. See Diana B. Henriques, A Legal-Fee Firecrackerin the Cendant Case, N.Y TiMES,July 14,
1998, at DI (noting that counsel for the New York State Common Retirement Fund which
is seeking lead plaintiff status in the Cendant Corporation class actions had previously contributed in excess of $40,000 to the campaign of the New York State Comptroller).
171. See Olson Testimony, supra note 169, at 9.
172. H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. § 101(a) (proposing to create Securities Act § 16(c)).
173. Securities Act § 16(c) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c)).
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
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from a federal court under the Uniform Standards Act's stay provision.
Removal allows the defendant to remove the action to federal court and
file a motion to dismiss based on the Uniform Standards Act. The motion
to dismiss automatically triggers the federal discovery stay under the Reform Act. If a non-preempted action has been erroneously removed to
federal court, subsection (d)(4) allows the federal court to remand the action to state court.175

THE NEW NATIONAL STANDARD
The adoption of the Uniform Standards Act has made federal law under the Reform Act the new national standard for most securities fraud
class actions. Accordingly, the operation of the Uniform Standards Act is
inextricably tied to the effectiveness of the Reform Act. This part of the
Article discusses recent developments under the Reform Act and the likely
impact of the Uniform Standards Act on some of the Reform Act's key
provisions. In assessing the post-Uniform Standards Act national standard,
the Article draws upon data gathered by the authors during the last three
years while studying private federal and state court litigation on behalf of
the SEC.
76
Two studies analyzed the first year of practice under the Reform Act. 1
177
Both concluded that it was too soon to judge its effectiveness.
This
conclusion continues to hold true today. With limited exceptions, none of
175. Securities Act § 16(d)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77p(d)(4)). In addition, the
House version of the "Delaware carve out" excludes fiduciary duty claims from the removal
provision, while the Senate version might have been interpreted to allow for their initial
removal to federal court. The Uniform Standards Act adopts the House version, thus leaving
state fiduciary duty claims to proceed in state court without the potential delay for removal
and remand.
A bill currently working its way through Congress could disrupt that arrangement. House
Bill 3789 would allow for removal of class actions, by any defendant or non-representative
plaintiff, whenever any member of the plaintiff class was a citizen of a different state than
any defendant. In effect, "minimal diversity" would be sufficient to bring any class action
into federal court. State substantive law would be applied, but subject to federal procedural
rules. This bill, if enacted in its present form, would undo at least part of the compromise
reached in the Delaware carve-out. State law would continue to apply, but it would be
interpreted exclusively by federal judges. Such an outcome would undermine the predictability of Delaware law, as well as eliminate the efficiency advantages for the resolution of
disputes offered by the Delaware Court of Chancery. At a minimum the class action removal
bill should be amended to incorporate the Delaware carve-out found in the Uniform Standards Act. Indeed, a broader carve-out would be necessary to preserve fiduciary duty claims
not involving the purchase or sale of a security.
176. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54; STANFORD STUDY, supranote 39. The Stanford
Study overlapped in certain areas with the SEC Staff Report. In addition, the Stanford Study
found that high technology issuers continue to be named most often in class actions, federal
claims are rarely filed against the largest issuers, and one plaintiffs' law firm appears in the
majority of securities class actions. STANFORD STUDY, supra note 39, at ii-iv.
177. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 80; STANFORD STUDY, supra note 39, at ii.
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the Reform Act's key provisions have been interpreted by federal appellate
courts. Nonetheless, certain early observations can be made. The Reform
Act's heightened pleading standards and stay of discovery have made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to file complaints that will withstand a motion
to dismiss. 178 Plaintiffs have responded with allegations in complaints that
generally appear to be specific to the action and do not follow the cookiecutter mold prevalent before the Reform Act. 179 Notwithstanding this
higher pleading bar, the Reform Act has not chilled plaintiffs from filing
suit. It has, however, made early dismissal more commonplace. 180 In securing more early dismissals, the Reform Act is having its intended effect.
Other provisions of the Reform Act, including the lead plaintiff provision
and the safe harbor for forward-looking statements, have been less successful to date. There are reasons, several of which are discussed in the
next section, to doubt that the Uniform Standards Act will significantly
improve the performance of these provisions.
Scienter
One of the principal barriers erected by the Reform Act to the filing
181
of securities class actions is its stringent standard for pleading scienter.
Under the Reform Act's heightened pleading standard, a complaint must
"state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind." 182 This language mirrors the standard existing in the Second Circuit prior to adoption of the
Reform Act. This standard was satisfied by alleging either (i) facts to show
that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or
(ii) facts that constituted strong circumstantial evidence of conscious behavior or recklessness. ' 83 Statements appear in the Reform Act's Statement
of Managers to the effect that Congress intended to strengthen the Second
Circuit standard. 184 The defense bar has seized on this legislative history
to argue that recklessness no longer suffices as a basis to plead scienter.
The dispute over the proper interpretation of the Reform Act's heightened
pleading standards has created a split in the district courts. The rejection
of recklessness by a significant number of federal district courts when
interpreting the Reform Act's pleading standards is perhaps the major

178. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 5.
179. Id. at 4, 22.
180. See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
181. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 28.

182. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
183. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 E3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).
184. Statement of Managers, supra note 3, at n.23 ("[T]he Conference Committee chose
not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, opportunity, and
recklessness.").
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concern raised by the Uniform Standards Act's displacement of state law
85
in favor of a national standard.1
185. Since passage of the Reform Act, 11 courts have rejected recklessness as a basis for
pleading scienter in securities fraud cases. See In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 90,236, at 91,029 (S.D.N.Y Jul. 22, 1998); In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig.,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7926 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 1998); Chan v. Orthologic Corp., et al., No.
CIV-96-1514-PHX-RCB (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 1998) (dicta); In re Glenayre Technologies, Inc.,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,571, at 97,829 (Dec. 10, 1997); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
Case No. 96-7371 1-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17262 at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 18, 1997); In
re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 970 E Supp. 746, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Voit v. Wonderware
Corp., 977 E Supp. 363, 374 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Powers v. Eichen, 977 E Supp. 1031, 1039
(S.D. Cal. 1997); Norwood Venture Corp. v. Converse Inc., 959 E Supp. 205, 208 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic, Inc., 959 E Supp. 42, 48-49 (D. Mass. 1997); Havenick
v. Network Express, Inc., 981 E Supp. 480, 528 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
By contrast, 28 courts have held that allegations of recklessness continue to suffice. Scott
v. Steingold, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15810 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1998); Robertson v. Strassner,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15861 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1998); Bryant v. Apple South, Inc., 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12125 (M.D. Ga.July 29, 1998); Allison v. Brooktree Corp., 999 E Supp.
1342, 1343 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Varljen v. HJ. Meyers, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,259, at
91,146 (Aug. 19, 1998); Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
90,289, at 91,098 (Aug. 5, 1998); Walish v. The Leverage Group, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 90,229, at 90,983 (Jul. 8, 1998); Miller v. Material Sciences Corp., No. 97c2450,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10052, at *2 (N.D. 11.June 25, 1998); Blum v. Semiconductor Packaging Materials Co., No. 97-7078, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6868, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 5,
1998); Epstein v. Itron, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,157, at 90,460 (Mar. 11, 1998);
Adair v. Bristol Technology Systems, Inc., 179 ER.D. 126, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Zuckerman
v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 4 E Supp. 2d 618, 622 (N.D. Tex. 1998); City of Painesville v.
First Montauk Financial Corp., 180 ER.D. 178, 187 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Weikel v. Tower
Semiconductor Ltd., No. 96-3711, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22229, at *I (D.NJ. Oct. 2, 1997);
Gilford Partners L.P v. Sensormatic Elec. Corp., No. 96C4072, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13724, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1997); Galaxy Inv. Fund, Ltd. v. Fenchurch Capital Management, Ltd., No. 96C8098, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13207 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1997); Shahzad v. HJ. Meyers & Co., Inc., No. 95 Civ. 6196 (DAB), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1128, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997); In re Wellcare Management Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 964 E Supp.
632, 641 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Page v. Derrickson, No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3673, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997); Pilarczyk v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 965 E
Supp. 311, 320 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); OnBank & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 967 E Supp. 81, 88 & n.4
(WD.N.Y 1997); Fugman v. Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F Supp. 1190,1195 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Rehm
v. Eagle Fin. Co., 954 E Supp. 1246, 1252-53 (N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Health Management
Inc., 970 E Supp. 192, 201-03 (E.D.N.Y 1997); Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorporation, No.
96-1567-CIV-T-17A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17670, at *3 (Nov. 14, 1996); STI Classic Fund
v. Bollinger Indus., Inc., No. 3-96-CV-823-R, 1996 WL 885802, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25,
1996); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 E Supp. 431, 438 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Marksman Partners, L.P.
v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 E Supp. 1297, 1309 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1996);.
A separate issue is whether allegations of motive and opportunity continue to suffice. The
courts rejecting recklessness have generally also rejected motive and opportunity, while the
courts continuing to allow recklessness tend to hold that motive and opportunity remains a
valid basis for pleading scienter. Seven courts, however, have held that while allegations of
recklessness survive, motive and opportunity, in and of itself, is no longer a valid basis to
plead scienter. In re Health Management Sys., Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,235, at
91,022 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 22, 1998); Walther v. Maricopa Int'l Inv. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 90,203, at 90,741 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1998); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec.
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Although the national standard mandated by the Uniform Standards
Act offers increased predictability, that standard should be one that protects investors and deters fraud. Rejecting recklessness at the pleading stage
calls into question its vitality as a basis for imposing liability. It would hardly
make sense to find recklessness insufficient at the pleading stage, but sufficient to impose liability. The SEC has long taken the position that liability
for reckless violators is essential to any investor protection scheme. A higher
standard would allow corporate managers to turn a blind eye to evidence
contradicting their public statements.186 Accordingly, during the hearings
on the Uniform Standards Act, the SEC made clear that it could not
support a national fraud standard that did not impose liability upon reck87
less violators of the law.1
In addressing the SEC's concern, the Senate sought to provide assurances in Senate Bill 1260's legislative history that the national standard
would include liability for recklessness:

[T]he Committee emphasizes that the clear intent in 1995 and our
continuing intent in this legislation is that neither the PSLRA nor S.
1260 in any way alters the scienter standard in federal securities fraud
suits. It was the intent of Congress, as was expressly stated during the
legislative debate on the PSLRA, and particularly during the debate
on overriding the President's veto, that the PSLRA establish a uniform federal standard on pleading requirements by adopting the
pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Indeed the express language of the PSLRA itself carefully provides
that plaintiffs must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."
The Committee emphasizes that neither the PSLRA nor S. 1260
188
makes any attempt to define that state of mind.
Litig., I E Supp. 2d 1096, 1107 (D. Nev. 1998); Novak v. Kasaks, 997 E Supp. 425, 430
(S.D.N.Y 1998); Press v. Quick & Reilly Group, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4278 (RPP), 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11609, at *2, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1997); In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 E Supp.
238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Myles v. MidCom Communications, Inc., No. C96-614D (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 19, 1996); see also In re Boeing Sec. Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at *38
(W.D. Wa. Sept. 8, 1998) (holding that "motive, opportunity, and non-deliberate recklessness
may provide some evidence of intentional wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient to support
scienter unless the totality of the circumstances creates a strong inference of fraud").
186. See, e.g., October 29 Hearing, supra note 14, at 13 ("A uniform federal standard that did
not include recklessness as a basis for liability would jeopardize the integrity of the securities
markets, and would deal a crippling blow to defrauded investors with meritorious claims.")
(statement of SEC).
187. Id. at 14 ("Should the courts of appeals conclude that the Reform Act has somehow
eliminated recklessness as a basis for antifraud liability, the preservation of state remedies
that allow recovery for reckless conduct would be critical.").
188. S.REP. No. 105-182, at 5-6 (1998). The House Report is silent on the scienter issue.
A colloquy on the House Floor between Representatives Chris Cox and Anna Eshoo confirm
that they also had not intended for the Reform Act to alter securities fraud scienter requirements. See H. REP. No. H6061 (July 21, 1998).
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A colloquy between Senators Christopher Dodd and Alfonse D'Amato on
the Senate floor further emphasizes the point:
Mr.D'Amato: I was surprised and dismayed to learn that some district
court decisions had not followed the clear language of the '95 Reform
Act, which is the basis upon which the uniform national standard in
today's legislation will be created.
Mr. Dodd: It appears that these district courts have misread the language of the '95 Reform Act's Statement of Managers... I can only
hope that when the issue reaches the federal courts of appeals, these
courts will undertake a more thorough review of the legislative history
and correct these decisions.
Mr.D'Amato: I agree that investors must be allowed a means to recover
losses created by reckless misconduct....
Mr.Dodd: I am glad that we have had this opportunity to clarify how
the PSLRA's pleading standards will function as the national standard
to be created in S. 1260.189
This language and colloquy enabled both the SEC and the White House
to support the Uniform Standards Act.190
Recklessness' status as part of the national standard for pleading and
proving fraud reemerged when the Conference Committee resolved the
differences between the House and Senate version of the bill. The Conference Committee produced a Statement of Managers that takes up less
than two pages in the Congressional Record, but the Committee nonetheless deemed recklessness important enough to devote five paragraphs
to the issue under a separate heading entitled, "Scienter."
189. 144 CONG. Ritc. S4798-99 (daily ed. May 13, 1998).
190. See Letter from Chairman Arthur Levitt, Commissioner Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., and
Commissioner Laura Unger to Senators Alfonse D'Amato, Phil Gramm, and Christopher
Dodd (Mar. 24, 1998) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of
Law) ("[W]e were gratified [tolearn that you will] restate in S.1260's legislative history, and
in the expected debate on the Senate floor, that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 did not, and was not intended to, alter the well-recognized and critically important
scienter standard.... We support enactment of S. 1260 with ...this important legislative
history."); Letter from Bruce Lindsey and Gene Sperling to Senators Alfonse D'Amato, Phil
Gramm, and Christopher Dodd (Apr. 28, 1998) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University
of Maryland School of Law) ("Since the uniform standards provided by S. 1260 will provide
that class actions generally can only be brought in federal court ...it is particularly important
to the President that you be clear that the federal law to be applied includes recklessness as
a basis for pleading and liability in securities fraud class actions.... So long as ...appropriate
legislative history and floor statements on the subject of legislative intent are included in the
legislative record, the Administration would support enactment of S. 1260."). Commissioner
Norman Johnson dissented from the Commission's support. See Letter from Commissioner
Norman Johnson to Senators Alfonse D'Amato, Phil Gramm, and Christopher Dodd
(Mar. 24, 1998) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law) ("I
believe that much more conclusive evidence [of a problematic migration] than currently
exists should be required before the state courthouse doors are closed to small investors.").
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This Statement should help eliminate judicial confusion on the question
of recklessness as a scienter standard. According to the Statement, "[i]t is
the clear understanding of the managers that Congress did not, in adopting the Reform Act, intend to alter the standards of liability under the
Exchange Act."' 19 1 When Congress passed the Reform Act, all of the
courts of appeals that had addressed that question had held that recklessness suffices to prove scienter in a securities fraud action. 192 Recklessness
should continue under the national standard as a sufficient state of mind
to find a defendant liable in a securities fraud class action, unless the U.S.
Supreme Court rejects the unanimous interpretation of the courts of appeals.
The Statement also makes clear that "it was the intent of Congress...
that the Reform Act establish a heightened uniform federal standard on
pleading requirements based upon the pleading standard applied by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals."' 193 This language is more emphatic
than the language in the Reform Act's Statement of Managers which
stated that the pleading standard is "based in part" on the Second Circuit
standard. 194 The words "in part" had muddied the waters for district
courts attempting to interpret the Reform Act. Recklessness has always
been a key component of the Second Circuit pleading standard, and the
clear language of the Statement of Managers reaffirming the viability of
that standard allowed the SEC to support the final bill and the President
195
to sign it into law.
Notwithstanding the position adopted by the Statement of Managers,
the debate over the continuing validity of recklessness as a basis to plead
and prove fraud seems destined to continue. Evidently unable to get their
way at Conference, two members of the House engaged in a colloquy at
the time of passage attacking recklessness and the Second Circuit pleading
standard. 196 Moreover, one of these members inserted a statement arguing
there is no statutory basis for liability based on recklessness. 197 The col191. Statement of Managers, supra note 3.
192. See Walker & Levine, supra note 23, at 30 (collecting cases).
193. Statement of Managers, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
194. Id.

195. Statement by President WilliamJ. Clinton (Nov. 3, 1998) (signing Uniform Standards
Act into law) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Letter
from Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC; Isaac C. Hunt,Jr., Commissioner, SEC; Paul R. Carey,
Commissioner, SEC; Laura S. Unger, Commissioner, SEC, to The Honorable Alfonse M.
D'Amato, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs and The Honorable
Paul S. Sarbanes, Ranking Minority Leader, Committee on Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs (Oct. 9, 1998) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of
Law).

196. See 144 CONG. REc. H 10780-H 10781 (colloquy between Representatives Tom Bliley
and Chris Cox).
197. The circumstances surrounding the original insertion of this statement into the

record, as well as the original printing of the Statement of Managers, generated further
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loquy triggered a number of contrary statements by other members of
Congress. 198
The issue of whether recklessness suffices to plead scienter will soon be
addressed in three cases pending in the federal courts of appeal. 199 The
decisions in these cases will likely provide a clear answer to whether the
Uniform Standards Act prematurely displaced state law. Should recklessness be lost, further legislation will be needed to restore it as part of the
national standard. Indeed, Senator Dodd has pledged to introduce such
legislation if the U.S. Supreme Court holds that recklessness does not
200
suffice as a basis for pleading and proving fraud.
The Discovery Stay
The Reform Act's discovery stay also presents a substantial obstacle to
maintaining a securities fraud suit.20 ' The Reform Act stays discovery
pending a motion to dismiss unless the court finds that particularized dis2°2
covery is necessary to preserve evidence or prevent undue prejudice.
The stay is designed to banish "fishing expedition" lawsuits in which defendants are often forced to settle rather than incur the burdensome costs
controversy. Representative John D. Dingell observed:
The final page [of the Statement of Manager, as originally printed] mysteriously disappeared. Curiously, this page contained important language regarding scienter, recklessness, and the pleading standard applied by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
language essential to the conference agreement.... The unidentified material that follows the names of the Managers [i.e., the Bliley Statement], although erroneously
printed in the same typeface as the conference report,... is not part of the conference
report's joint explanatory statement and does not represent the view of the Managers.
In point of fact, the phantom language directly contradicts the joint explanatory statement...."
144 CONG. REC. E2246 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1998). Both printing errors were subsequently
corrected.
198. See Statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato, 144 CONG. REC. S12738 (daily ed. Oct.
20, 1998); Statement of SenatorJack Reed, 144 CONG. REC. S12906 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1998); Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, 144 CONG. REC. S12737 (Oct. 20, 1998); Statement of Representative John D. Dingell, 144 CONG. REC. E2246 (Oct. 20, 1998); Statement
of EdwardJ. Markey, 144 CONG. REC. H10781 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1998); Statement of
Anna Eshoo, 144 CONG. REc. E2296 (Oct. 21, 1998).
199. The first decision should come from the Ninth Circuit in In re Silicon Graphics Securities
LItig., No. 97-16240 (9th Cir.). Oral argument was held on June 11, 1998 and a decision is
pending. The issue was again heard by the Ninth Circuit in Zeid v.Kmberley, No. 97-16070
(9th Cir.). The issue will also soon be addressed by the Sixth Circuit in Hoffnan v. Comshare,
Inc., No. 97-2098 (6th Cir.) (oral argument has not yet been calendared). The Commission
has appeared as amicus curiae in all three cases arguing in favor of the Second Circuit standard.
200. See 144 CONG. REC. S4798 (daily ed. May 13, 1998) ("[S]hould the Supreme Court
eventually find that recklessness no longer suffices to meet the scienter standard, it is my
intent to introduce legislation that would explicitly restore recklessness as the pleading and
liability standard for federal securities fraud lawsuits.").
201. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 15.
202. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
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of discovery.20 3 During the hearings that led to the Reform Act, Congress
heard testimony that discovery accounts for approximately 80% of defense
204

costs in securities class actions.
The stay has been rigorously enforced at the federal level. It has been
held to extend to disclosure required by Federal Rule Civil Procedure
26(a), 20 5 to remain in place pending reconsideration of a motion to dismiss,
and to afford protection to non-parties. 20 6 More tellingly, a court has lifted
the stay in only one out of the 280 cases filed during 1996 and 1997.207
For those issuers that succeed with their motions to dismiss, the costs of
defending non-meritorious securities fraud actions should be greatly reduced.

The stay, however, has been easily avoided. Although strictly applied in
federal court, the stay was circumvented prior to the Uniform Standards
Act by filing in state court. It remains to be seen whether the Uniform
Standards Act's stay provision (along with its preemption provisions) will
end the dual-track litigation that undermines the discovery stay.

Statistical Analysis of Rulings on Motions to Dismiss
The effect of the Reform Act's heightened pleading standards and discovery stay is reflected in the increased percentage of motions to dismiss
being granted by district courts. In the 280 class actions filed during 1996

203. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (1995).
204. Id.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 26(a) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
206. See Medhekar v. U.S. District Court, 99 F3d 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
discovery stay also encompasses the disclosures mandated by FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)); Powers
v. Eichen, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,552, at 97,757 (S.D. Cal.June 2, 1998) (continuing
to stay discovery during the court's reconsideration of its ruling on a motion to dismiss); In
re Trump Hotel Shareholder Derivative Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,537, at 97,653
(S.D.N.Y Oct. 15, 1997) (imposing discovery stay in a derivative action alleging a federal
securities law claim); Kane v. Madge Networks N.V, Case No.: C96-20652 RMW (N.D. Cal.,
Jan. 13, 1997) (affording protection of the discovery stay to non-parties) (on file with The
Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Novak v. Kasaks, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 99,307, at 95,861 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1996) (same). But see Levy v. United
HealthCare Corp, Civ. No. 3-96-750 (D. Minn. Sept. 10, 1996) (allowing FED. R. Civ. P
26(a) disclosure to go forward notwithstanding a motion to dismiss) (on file with The Business
Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
207. See In re Websecure, Inc. Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,112, at 90,153
(D.Mass. Jan. 23, 1998) (granting limited relief from the stay in an action seeking injunctive
relief so that the plaintiffs could conduct expedited discovery concerning the viability of the
defendant to continue as an operating business); see also Mishkin v. Ageloff, 220 Bankr. 784
(S.D.N.Y 1998) (reversing decision of bankruptcy court judge which granted trustee relief
from discovery stay). Other requests by plaintiffs for relief from the stay have been denied.
See Novak v. Kasaks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11778 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 16, 1996); Medical Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 E Supp. 717 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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20 8
and 1997, the authors have gathered 100 rulings on a motion to dismiss.
As the following chart illustrates, more than half (60%) have been granted
in some form. Fifteen were granted with prejudice; thirty-four were
granted with leave to amend; and eleven were granted in part and denied
in part.
This dismissal rate appears to be significantly higher than pre-Reform
Act. For instance, Congress heard evidence that in 1992 approximately
4 %
0
of all federal securities class actions were dismissed on motion prior
to trial. 20 9 Available data also shows that in 1990 and 1991, 38% of the
210
cases filed by a leading plaintiffs' law firm were dismissed on motion.
In addition, data provided by the Big Six accounting firms shows that for
the years 1990 to 1992, they were successful on motions to dismiss 33%,
24%, and 40% of the time, respectively. 211 This evidence confirms that
the Reform Act's heightened pleading standards and discovery stay have
made it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in federal securities class
actions.
Closer analysis of the dismissal data reveals that the Northern District
of California, home to Silicon Valley and more securities class actions
than any other district, has adopted particularly stringent pleading standards. Post-Reform Act, nine out of ten motions to dismiss have been
granted in this district, at least in part. 212 This high dismissal rate, along
with other factors, including defendant-friendly local rules 213 and decisions
calling recklessness into question, suggest that the Northern District of
California has become an inhospitable forum for securities class actions.
This higher dismissal rate in the Northern District reflects the dramatic
change in pleading practices in the Ninth Circuit. Pre-Reform Act, the
Ninth Circuit allowed scienter to be averred generally, that is, simply by
saying it existed. 2 14 The Reform Act's pleading standards have brought
the Ninth Circuit into conformity with the more rigorous requirements
imposed by the Second Circuit and other circuits.

208. Although mainly class actions, this total does include nine individual actions. It also
includes actions filed post-Reform Act but dismissed on non-Reform Act grounds. If the
opinion or order does not specify dismissal with prejudice, it was counted as without prejudice.
209. See Testimony of ProfessorJoel Seligman, Univ. of Michigan Law School, Before the Subcomm.
on Telecom. & Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Aug. 10, 1994).
210. Id.

211. Id.
212. The denial came in Hoffnan v. Avant! Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21823 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 18, 1997).
213. In March 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California implemented several new local rules which, among other things, keep the discovery stay in place
until a lead plaintiff is chosen. The local rules also require all parties to post most court
filings on a "Designated Internet Site." The local rules can be found at <http://securities
.stanford.edu>.
214. In re GlenFed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
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Rulings on Motions to Dismiss

i

Denied
Granted with leave to amend

I

Granted with prejudice
Granted in part

Litigation Rates
The increased rate of dismissal for securities class actions has not produced a reduction in the number of filings; rather, the rate of filing appears
to have increased. The number of companies sued in federal court dropped
during 1996, the first year of practice under the Reform Act. The SEC
Staff Report found that 105 companies were sued in federal court during
1996, compared to 158 in 1995, 221 in 1994, and 153 in 1993.215 As the
following chart illustrates, however, the 175 filings in 1997 marked a return
to pre-Reform Act levels.
The 175 companies sued in federal securities class actions during 1997
is on par with the 177 suit average during the three years leading up to
passage of the Act. Moreover, the authors have counted 118 companies
that have been sued in federal securities class actions during the first six
months of 1998. This projects to an annualized total of 236, the highest
215. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 20-2 1. NERA's numbers as to the number
of federal class action filings is: 1991 (153), 1992 (192), 1993 (158), 1994 (220), and 1995
(162). NERA STUDY, supra note 39, at Table 1. The Stanford Study relied on NERA for the
1991 to 1995 federal filing numbers. STANFORD STUDY, supra note 39, at 6. The Stanford
Study found 124 companies sued in federal class actions during 1996 (annualized number).
Id. at 4.
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total in recent years. This evidence shows that the Reform Act has done
little to reduce the number of class action filings.
The increased dismissal rate for class actions may be causally related to
the increased number of filings seen in 1997 and 1998. The plaintiffs'
lawyers operate by holding a diversified portfolio of lawsuits rather than
investing all of their firms' resources in any one claim. The increased rate
of dismissals means that firms will have to file more suits in order to get
the same return from their portfolios. Plaintiffs' lawyers may find it difficult
to determine the merits of a lawsuit before filing it, given their lack of
access to the defendants' records and state of mind. In addition, there
remains considerable uncertainty concerning the Reform Act's pleading
standards. Given these uncertainties, bringing additional suits may be a
rational response to the higher dismissal rate.
The Safe Harbor
Securities Act Rule 175,216 promulgated by the SEC, gave safe harbor
protection to forward-looking statements in documents filed with the Corn-

216. 17 C.ER. § 230.206 (1998).
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mission. 2 17 The safe harbor offered no protection, however, if statements
were prepared without a reasonable basis in fact or were disclosed other
than in good faith. 2 18 Surveys showed that Rule 175 did little to encourage
219
It
issuers to disclose forward-looking information to the marketplace.
was widely believed that Rule 175 did not provide adequate comfort
against the specter of expensive class action litigation should the projection
22 0
or development cited in the forward-looking statement not materialize.
Particular criticism was aimed at the facts that Rule 175 only covered
statements made in documents filed with the Commission, and, by using
a factually-oriented test of good faith and reasonableness, it prevented
22 1
early dismissal before discovery.
In enacting the Reform Act's safe harbor, Congress sought to respond
to these problems with Rule 175.222 Unlike Rule 175, the Act's safe harbor
covers all forward-looking statements whether or not made in documents
filed with the Commission. 223 In addition, the "meaningful" cautionary
language prong is meant to allow for the early and inexpensive dismissal
of suits when appropriate because it allows for objective determination by
a judge. 224 The motions to dismiss issued to date decided on the basis of
the safe harbor confirm that it affords issuers greater protection than Rule
175.225 If the trend established by the opinions continues, issuers should
be more forthcoming with projections. The cases to date, all decided by
district courts, address the following questions.
What is a "Fonvard-LookingStatement"?
In Harrisv. IVAX Corp.,226 the court liberally construed what counts as
217. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Rel. No. 6084 (June 25, 1979).
218. Id. A corresponding Exchange Act rule, Rule 3b-6, was simultaneously adopted.
219. See American Stock Exchange CEO Survey, Securities Litigation and Stock Option
Accounting (April 1994) (noting that 54% of the 218 executives of AMEX-listed companies
stated that the prospect of litigation affected their decision to disseminate forward-looking
information); Statement of Kenneth McLennan, President, Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation, Inc. on Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements to the SEC
(Jan. 11, 1995) (The Alliance has 500 member companies, all involved in the manufacturing
industry. Mr. McLennan's statement announced results of a member survey finding that only
17 % make forward-looking statements.).
220. Concept Release, Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Rel.
No. 7101, 1994 SEC LEXIS 3099, at *30 (Oct. 1994).
221. Id. at *32-*34.
222. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 16 (1995) (stating that Rule 175 "has not provided companies
meaningful protection from litigation").
223. Securities Act § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(A); Exchange Act § 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(E).
224. See Statement of Managers, supra note 3, at 44 ("The use of the words 'meaningful'
and 'important factors' are intended to provide a standard for the types of cautionary statements upon which a court may, where appropriate, decide a motion to dismiss, without
examining the state of mind of the defendant.").
225. See infra notes 226-42 and accompanying text.
226. 998 E Supp. 1448 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
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a forward-looking statement for purposes of the safe harbor.227 The court
deemed the statement, "[w]e believe that the challenges unique to this
period in our history are behind us," to be forward-looking because in the
court's view the statement equated to "despite the rough period, good
times are ahead. '228 In addition, the court deemed IVAX's failure to disclose the impaired value of its good will to be forward-looking because it
reflected a judgment that goodwill was strong and would not be written
down anytime soon. 229 The court afforded safe harbor protection upon
finding that the warnings accompanying the disclosure were tailored to
IVAX's particular situation and were not boilerplate.23 0 In other cases,
present tense statements having no forward-looking implication have been
denied safe harbor coverage. 231 In addition, statements of present fact
cannot be couched as assumptions underlying a projection to receive the
232
benefit of the safe harbor.
How Much Risk FactorDisclosure Is Necessary?
The answer appears to be some but not all. In a brief opinion, the court
in Rasheedi v. Cree Research, Inc.,233 dismissed the complaint after finding that
a discussion of one of the factors to cause the results to differ was included.
The court found that the failure to discuss other factors was irrelevant.
Following the Reform Act's legislative history, the court held that "Defendants must identify significant factors that may cause results to materially
differ-but not all factors.' '234 It has been held, however, that boilerplate
235
disclosure will not suffice.
How May the Knowledge ProngBe Satisfied?
At the pleading stage, the Reform Act requires that plaintiffs present
evidence supporting allegations of knowing misstatements. In IVAX, the
court held that plaintiffs pleading that defendants acted with knowledge
may not rely on "conclusory allegations. ' 236 The same holding was

227. Id. at 1449, 1453.
228. Id. at 1453.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1454.
231. See Robertson v. Strassner, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15861, at *21 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 7,
1998); In re Olympic Fin. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *13-14 (D. Minn.
Sept. 10, 1998).
232. In re Boeing Sec. Litig.,1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8,
1998).
233. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16968 Nos. 1:96CV00890, 1:96CV01069 (M.D.N.C. Oct.
17, 1997).
234. Id. at *1 (emphasis added); see also IVAX Corp., 998 F Supp. at 1454 (same).
235. See In re Boeing, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *21.
236. IVAX Corp., 998 E Supp. at 1454.
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reached by the court in In re Advanta Corp. SecuritiesLitigation.237 In addition,
it has been held that the allegation that "defendants knew or were reckless
infailing to know" that the projection was false would not survive the
238
effect of the safe harbor.
In refusing to dismiss claims pursuant to the safe harbor, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Nevada has commented, "[t]
he shortness of time
between later revealed truth and prior statements can be circumstantial
evidence that the optimistic statements were false or misleading when
made. '2 39 The court added, however, that absence of a catastrophic event
between the time the projection is made and the truth pans out does not
create a presumption that defendants knew the projection was false when
made.240

How Often Must the Safe HarborBe Invoked When Making OralProjections?
Wenger v. Lumisys, Inc.241 provides guidance on this issue. The plaintiffs
argued that, in the course of a conference call with analysts, the defendant's executives were required to identify each projection as a forwardlooking statement and to indicate that actual results might materially differ.
The court held that requiring these cautionary statements to be recited
242
each time an oral projection is made would be absurd and unwieldy.
Rather, a blanket statement at the beginning of the call suffices.
Despite the protections afforded by the Reform Act safe harbor, it seems
that the issuer community is not taking full advantage of it. Based on
interviews of issuers and regular staff review of filings, the SEC Staff
Report found that "[c]ompanies have been reluctant to provide significandy more forward-looking disclosure beyond what they provided prior
to enactment of the safe harbor." 243 Issuers offered a handful of reasons
for their reluctance to utilize the safe harbor, including fear of liability in
state court, where the safe harbor does not expressly apply. Other reasons
offered included uncertainty as to how courts would interpret the inherently ambiguous term "meaningful" cautionary language, and concern
that inclusion of a cumbersome list of risk factors would make the com244
pany's disclosures unappealing.

237. No. 97-CV-4343, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10189 at *30 (E.D. Pa.July 9,1998) ("Plaintiffs' catch-all allegation that all speakers knew that their statements were false when made
is too broad ...").
238. Clark v. TRO Learning, Inc., No. 97 C 8683, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7989, at *5
(N.D. Ill. May 20, 1998).
239. In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 E Supp. 2d 1096, 1112 (D. Nev. 1998).
240. Id.
241. 2 F Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
242. Id. at 1242.
243. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 5.
244. Id. at 25-26.
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A recent study reaches the opposite conclusion. 245 The study examined
whether 547 computer, software, and drug firms provided more earnings
and sales forecasts in the year following passage of the Reform Act as
compared to the year prior to passage. 246 The study found the following
247
frequency of forecasts:

Number of Forecasts per Firm
0
1
2
3
4
5 or more

pre-Act
305 (56%)
113 (21%)
54(10%)
36 (6%)
18 (3%)
21 (4%)

post-Act
279
113
62
33
28
32

(51%)
(21%)
(11%)
(6%)
(5%)
(6%)

The study concludes that "there was a significant post-Act increase in
both the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the mean number of
248
forecasts issued."
A review of the underlying data, however, leads the authors to question
this conclusion. The number of firms making one or more forecasts is not
materially greater in the post-Act period. The only apparent material
change is that twenty-six firms (5% of the sample) that did not make a
forecast in the pre-Act period did so in the post-Act period.2 49 This slight
increase does not establish the Reform Act's safe harbor as a success. More
than half the firms comprising the sample (51 %) continue to refrain from
forward-looking disclosure post-Reform Act. The disclosure study further
finds that of those companies issuing projections, the mean number issued
increased from 2.1 prior to the Reform Act to 2.5 after its passage. 250
Although the increase suggests that the safe harbor is having some effect,
the increase is small, and presumably less than Congress expected when
it passed the Reform Act.
Although some form of preemption is necessary to promote the use of
safe harbor, we doubt that the Uniform Standards Act will stimulate much
additional disclosure. The Uniform Standards Act does nothing to resolve
issuers' concern over watering their disclosure down with an unattractive
laundry list of risk factors. More importantly, concerns as to what is meant
by "meaningful" cautionary language will continue until more courts pro245. MarilynJohnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure
of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, Research Paper No. 1471 (Jan.
1998) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
246. Id. at 12.
247. Id. at 28.
248. Id. at 23.
249. Id. at 14.
250. Id. at 12.
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vide guidance. Judicial interpretation of this term will have far greater
effect than preemption on the use of the safe harbor by issuers.
One very real benefit provided by the Uniform Standards Act's extension of safe harbor protection is that it gives companies some protection
against the spate of lawsuits anticipated to arise out of companies' failed
efforts to deal with the "Year 2000" problem. It is likely that a substantial
number of companies will have problems updating their computer systems
to deal with the transition to the next millennium. Inevitably, securities
fraud lawsuits based on inadequate or misleading disclosures will follow.2 51
The safe harbor for forward-looking statements should give companies
currently making Year 2000 disclosures comfort that they are not exposing
themselves to liability down the road. 252 The Uniform Standards Act gives
some assurance that state law will not undermine that protection.
The Lead Plaintiff Provision
One of the central goals of the Reform Act was to transfer control of
2 53
securities class actions from plaintiffs' lawyers to institutional investors.
Congress believed that, as America's largest shareholders, institutions
should presumptively be the most responsible lead plaintiffs. 254 Accordingly, the Reform Act encourages institutional control of class actions.
Within sixty days of notice that a complaint has been filed, any class
member may move to be named lead plaintiff.255 A rebuttable presumption exists that the most adequate plaintiff is the class member or group
of members having the largest financial interest in the relief sought in the
case. The most adequate plaintiff selects class counsel, subject to court
approval.
Prior to the Reform Act, lawyers raced to the courthouse to be the first
to file because the first filer was generally named lead plaintiff. More importantly, the lawyer for the lead plaintiff was generally named class counsel, thereby controlling the litigation and commanding the lion's share of
lawyers' fees. 256 In enacting the lead plaintiff provision, Congress sought
to replace alacrity in filing a complaint with accountability to investors as
the central criterion for selecting lead counsel.
251. See Armond Budish, Flood of Millennium Litgation Coming, THE PLAIN DEALER,
May 31, 1998, at 7J (noting how Year 2000 litigation-related seminars are already taking
place throughout the country).
252. See Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and
Consequences by Public Companies, Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal Securities Issuers, Securities Act Rel. No. 7558, at 14 (July 29, 1998) ("The statutory
safe harbors apply to forward-looking statements provided by eligible companies. Almost all
of the required MD&A disclosures concerning Year 2000 problems contain forward-looking
statements.").

253.
254.
255.
256.

Statement of Managers, supra note 3, at 30.
Id. at 34.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A).
Statement of Managers, supra note 3, at 33.
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The Staff Report found that the "race to the courthouse" by the plaintiffs' bar had slowed somewhat. During the first year after the passage of
the Reform Act, complaints were being filed an average of 79 days after
the release of bad news, as opposed to an average of 49 days before the
Act. 257 The race appears to be back on. Plaintiffs' firms are again competing to file the first complaint so they can be the first to publish notice
of the suit. Notice is used to attract potential clients; when grouped together, they can secure lead plaintiff status, and thus, lead counsel position
for the plaintiffs' lawyer.258 A recent sampling of 21 of the 1997 class
actions found that 6 had been filed within a week of release of the bad
news and a few had been filed within 48 hours. Of course, the Reform
Act does not prohibit the quick filing of a complaint. The Act's heightened
pleading standards, however, require detailed factual allegations of wrongdoing.2 59 Detailed allegations may be difficult to generate if complaints
are being filed within 48 hours of an adverse disclosure. Complaints hastily
thrown together may not fare well when faced with a motion to dismiss
under the new heightened pleading standards.
Institutions have not actively sought lead plaintiff status. In the 105
class actions filed in 1996, the SEC Staff Report found only 8 (8%
of the cases) in which institutions moved to be named lead plaintiff2 60 Institutional involvement declined further in 1997.261 In the
175 cases filed, institutions have sought lead plaintiff status in only 9

257. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 54, at 23.
258. The Internet has replaced newspaper print as the standard for publication. This
allows for worldwide distribution as well as perpetual access through searches of online
newswire databases. As a result the Internet is now awash with such notices. For example,
we ran a computer search finding 57 different notices relating to the class action against
Cendant Corporation alone.
259. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
260. Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Concerning the Implementation of the Private
Securities Litgation Reform Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and Hazardous Materials Comm.
on Commerce, at 7 n.7 (Oct. 21, 1997) [hereinafter October 21 Levitt Testimony] (listing the following cases: Cellstar Corp. (N.D. Tex.) (State of Wisconsin Investment Board); IVAX Corp.
(S.D. Fla.) (Pennsylvania School Employee Retirement System Pension Fund); Fleming Cos.
(W.D. Okla.) (City of Philadelphia, acting through its Board of Pensions and Retirement); In
re Summit Technology Sec. Litig. (D. Mass.) (Teachers' retirement System of Louisiana);
Micro Warehouse, Inc. (D. Conn.) (Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana & Pennsylvania School Employees Retirement System Pension Fund); In re Cephalon, Inc. Sec. Litig.
(E.D. Pa.) (Sands Point Partners, L.P); Pepsi-Cola Puerto Rico Bottling Co. (S.D. Fla.) (Sweetwater Investments, Inc.); OrthoLogic Corp. (D. Ariz.) (City of Philadelphia)). An institutional
investor apparently has sought lead plaintiff status in a ninth case. See In re Donnkenny Inc.
Sec. Litig. (Emanon Partners, L.P.), 1998 WL 299931 (S.D.N.Y June 8, 1998).
261. October 21 Levitt Testimony, supra note 260, at 7.
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The promise of the lead plaintiff provision remains unfulfilled,
with plaintiffs' lawyers continuing to call the shots in securities class ac263
tions.
Even in those instances when institutions come forward, there is no
guarantee they will be named lead plaintiff. In a class action against Oxford Health Plans, Inc., the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association (COLPERA) sought to be named lead plaintiff.264 With approximately $20 million in losses, COLPERA had the largest financial stake
in the class action. Nonetheless, two other parties made motions to join
COLPERA as co-lead plaintiffs.2 65 COLPERA objected to the motions.
The SEC filed an amicus brief arguing that, assuming COLPERA otherwise qualified as lead plaintiff, it should be appointed sole lead plaintiff:
'Allowing dispersal of the lead plaintiff's role among two or more competing plaintiffs would diminish the ability of a single lead plaintiff to
control the litigation, and would deter institutional investors from serving
in that role." 266 Apparently influenced by the cost and magnitude of the
case, the court declined to adopt the SEC's argument and appointed all
(5%).262

three parties as co-lead plaintiffs. 267 Dividing responsibility among three

parties may detract from the lead plaintiffs' monitoring of class counsel,
a central goal of the lead plaintiff provision. Other courts have also not
warmly greeted motions by institutions to serve as lead plaintiff.268
262. Id. at 8 n.8 (listing the following cases: Boston Chicken (D. Colo.) (Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana); Molten Metals (D. Mass.) (Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System); Mercury Finance (N.D. Ill.) (Minnesota State Board of Investment); Scholastic
Corp. (S.D.N.Y) (City of Philadelphia, acting through its Board of Pensions and Retirement);
U.S.A. Detergents (D.NJ.) (City of Philadelphia, acting through its Board of Pensions and
Retirement); Medaphis (N.D. Ga.) (Pennsylvania School Employees' Retirement System Pension Fund)); see also In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10694
(S.D.N.Y July 15, 1998) (Colpera); Joseph Herman v. Waste Management, Inc., No. 97 C
8769 (N.D. IllJan. 28, 1998) (City of Philadelphia); Blaich v. Employee Solutions, Inc., 1997
WL 842417 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 1997) (City of Philadelphia).
263. In addressing a group of lawyers, SEC Chairman Levitt expressed his concern over
lack of institutional involvement as lead plaintiff: "I do not want to urge you to advise your
clients to plunge in, headlong, into every suit that comes your way. But, in order to carry out
the intent of the new law, members of the bar should certainly urge their institutional clients
to explore their options more fully." Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the Practicing Law Institute
29th Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (Nov. 7, 1998) (available at <http://
www.sec.gov/statements & digests/speeches>).
264. In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10694 (S.D.N.Y
July 15, 1998). COLPERAs motion requesting certification for interlocutory appeal was
denied. In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12167 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 5,
1998).
265. Oxford Health, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10694, at *5.
266. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, In re
Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 7:97-8023 at 3 (CLB) (S.D.N.Y May 20, 1998) (on
file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
267. Id. at 8-10. Other cases have specifically declined to appoint multiple lead plaintiffs.
See, e.g., In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 ER.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y 1997).
268. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, Lapierriere v. Vesta Insurance Group, Civil Action
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Institutions, while not actively seeking lead plaintiff status, have pursued
their rights in other ways: bringing individual anti-fraud actions, 269 bring-

271
ing derivative actions, 270 writing to courts to object to settlements,
supporting other institutions as lead plaintiffs, 272 and acting as court-

appointed "monitors" of litigation.2 73 These efforts suggest that institutional investors are following the progress of class actions that affect their
interests. The lead plaintiff provision, however, does not often give them
adequate incentive to take the entire responsibility for serving as lead plaintiff in most cases.
The Uniform Standards Act could have the unintended effect of further
reducing the number of institutions moving to be named lead plaintiff. If
institutional investors seek lead plaintiff status post-Uniform Standards Act
in a class action, the Act's preemption provisions would bar them from
asserting pendent state claims in federal court. Institutions bringing indi-

No. 98-AR-1407-S (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 1998) ("The court is unable and/or unwilling to
decide between the competing plaintiff groups [one group is actually the Florida State Board
of Administration alone] and therefore will do the unprecedented and declare a tie to be
resolved by the tossing of a coin.") (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland
School of Law).
269. See October 21 Levitt Testimony, supra note 260, at n. 11 (listing the following: Bay Network (Florida State Board of Administration); Informix (Teachers' Retirement System of
Louisiana and Florida State Board of Administration each brought individual actions);
D'Hondt v. Digi Int'l Inc., No. 97-440, 1997 WL 405668 (D. Minn. Apr. 3, 1997) (Louisiana
State Employees' Retirement System); MicroWarehouse (Florida State Board of Administration); In re Summit Medical Systems, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97-558, 1998 WL 353829 (D.
Minn. June 29, 1998) (Teachers' Retirement System of Louisiana); and Mercury Finance
(T. Rowe Price)).
270. See Largest Pension Fund Throws Weight Behind Columbia Suit, ANDREWS HEALTH CARE
FRAUD LITIG. REP., at 3 (Oct. 1997) (discussing McCall v. Scott, No. 97-0838 (M.D. Tenn.)
(derivative suit brought by H. Carl McCall, as Comptroller of the State of New York and
as Trustee of the New York State Common Retirement Fund against Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corporation)); State Board of Administration of Florida v. Averhoff, No. 972729- I (Nashville Chancery Ct.) (similarly styled derivative action against Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corporation).
271. For example, in a class action against Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., the State of
Wisconsin Investment Board and the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association
objected to the one-third fee sought by the lawyers; the institutions asked the judge to award
17 .5%. The California Teachers' Retirement System wrote to the court joining in the objection. The judge reduced the fee to 20%. See Dean Starkman, Institutionsare ChallengingLegal
Fees, WALL ST.J., Sept. 30, 1997, at B14.
272. See Gluck v. Cellstar, 976 F Supp. 542, 545 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (noting that BZW
Barclays Global Investors, N.A. and Mellon Bank Corporation submitted a letter to the court
in support of Wisconsin as lead plaintiff).
273. The State of Wisconsin Investment Board has successfully petitioned the court to be
appointed "monitor" of the S3 and Adaptek securities class actions. As monitor, SWIB is
added to the service list and may be heard on any issue. But see Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., No.
3:97CV-835-5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 1998) (memorandum opinion and order) (denying SWIB's
motion to enter an appearance and act as a monitor of the litigation) (on file with The Business
Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law).
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vidual actions in federal court, however, would remain free to assert state
claims pendent to their federal claims. This incentive to bring individual
actions could reduce further the small number of institutional investors
seeking lead plaintiff status.

CONCLUSION
While developments in California may have led to the passage of the
Uniform Standards Act, that Act is, of course, not limited to preempting
California class actions. Rather, it preempts securities class actions in all
fifty states in favor of a unitary national standard. A national standard for
securities fraud litigation has a compelling logic for the orderly mind. As
Chairman Levitt said during the hearings on NSMIA, "The current system of dual federal-state regulation is not the system that Congress or the
Commission would create today.. . . An appropriate balance can be attained in the federal-state arena that better allocates responsibilities, reduces compliance costs and facilitates capital formation, while continuing
274
to provide for the protection of investors."
Notwithstanding the logic of a national standard, the role of federalism
in our constitutional order recognizes our commitment to diversity of legal
regimes. There is a strong presumption in our legal culture that the states
should be left free to regulate even where Congress has acted. In adopting
the securities laws during the 1930s, Congress explicitly preserved the role
275
of state law in protecting the securities markets from fraud and abuse.
The perceived migration of securities class actions to state courts, however,
threatened to undermine the policy goals established by Congress in enacting the Reform Act. The Uniform Standards Act seeks to eliminate the
use of state courts to circumvent the Reform Act. Subsequent study will
be needed to determine whether the Uniform Standards Act serves the
goals of the Reform Act and to determine the consequences of establishing a uniform national standard for securities class actions.
By greatly reducing the threat of state securities litigation under a multiplicity of standards, the Uniform Standards Act promises corporations
a national standard with greater predictability and reduced liability exposure. The Uniform Standards Act should allow companies to determine
more precisely their disclosure obligations and potential liabilities because
they can look primarily to federal law. Accordingly, the Uniform Standards
Act should reduce compliance and liability costs for a substantial

274. Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Concerning S. 1815, The "SecuritiesInvestment Promotion
Act of 1996" (June 5, 1996).

275. Both the Securities Act and Exchange Act contain savings clauses. Securities Act
§ 16, 15 U.S.C. § 77p; Exchange Act § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb.
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portion of the corporate community. 27 6 These are important benefits that
only a national standard can produce.
There are reasons to doubt, however, the extent to which the Uniform
Standards Act will succeed in producing a truly national standard. State
securities regulators continue to exercise their traditional enforcement authority over the accuracy of corporate statements. More importantly, institutions and wealthy individuals remain free to sue in state courts. Institutional investors now hold the majority of securities in this country and
account for the overwhelming majority of securities trading.277 If these
large investors opt for state actions on a substantial scale, the goal of a
national standard for securities fraud actions will be frustrated. This advantage held by large investors, while probably small now, could become
substantial during the anticipated litigation explosion associated with the
"Year 2000" computer malfunctions: the federal safe harbor for forwardlooking statements does not by its terms apply to state actions.
Encouraging institutional investors to opt for state court actions over
federal class actions imposes costs apart from its impairment of the goal
of national uniformity. It also could affect small investors. By discouraging
institutional investors from participating in federal class actions that include the small investor, the Uniform Standards Act leaves small investors
more vulnerable to potential overreaching by plaintiffs' lawyers. Protecting
small investors was purportedly an important objective of the Reform Act,
and it certainly was the central premise of the lead plaintiff provision.
The interests of institutional investors would be harnessed with those of
small investors, and the institutions would take charge of class actions on
small investors' behalf. The failure of the lead plaintiff provision suggests
that this scenario has not played out as Congress intended. Institutional
investors, not surprisingly, have looked out for their own interests-they
have no duty, legal or moral, to protect unaffiliated small investors. The
preferences (intended or not) given to institutional investors in the Uniform
Standards Act exacerbates the divergence of interests between small investors and institutions. Small investors cannot rely on institutional investors for their protection.
Investor protection loses from the Uniform Standards Act in other ways.
Although the Matsushita "reverse auction" problem may have been miti276. A substantial number of companies have nationally traded securities and thus have
diminished liability in state court. At the end of 1996, 2907 companies had securities trading
on the NYSE. NYSE FACT BOOK (1996). At the end of 1996, 751 companies had securities
trading on the AMEX. 1997 AMEX FACT BOOK. In addition, at the end of 1996, 4371
securities traded on NASDAQ. NASDAQFACT BOOK (1997). As a point of reference, over
9000 issuers report to the SEC.
277. See Elliott J. Weiss &John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2055-56,
nn.9 & 10 (June 1995) (noting that institutions own an estimated 53% of public and private
equity and that institutions accounted for an estimated 66% of daily share volume on the
NYSE in 1992).

Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act

53

gated, substantial state protections have been sacrificed. State statutes provide relief for investors not available under the national standard postReform Act, such as aiding and abetting liability and longer statutes of
limitations.2 78 Congress rebuffed attempts to make these elements of the
national standard as part of the Uniform Standards Act. 2 79 And if recklessness is overturned as the federal standard for scienter, despite support
from the Uniform Standards Act's legislative history, investors may face
insurmountable obstacles to recovery Institutional investors, of course, will
not face these limitations, as they can continue to proceed under state law.
The rise of institutional investors was supposed to provide important
benefits for investor protection-pension and mutual funds make up a
wealthy, well-organized interest group, likely to have substantial clout in
the legislature, whether it be state or federal. The institutions, the theory
goes, in pursuing their own self-interest, would also look out for the interests of small investors. But when push came to shove in the interest-group
lobbying over the Uniform Standards Act, institutions were largely silent.
Their silence is hardly a surprise, as the limitations on state class actions
do not affect the institutions' ability to protect their investments. Their
continued ability to rely on state law in individual actions is a fortuitous
by-product of the Uniform Standards Act's focus on class actions.
Congress ignored pleas during the Uniform Standards-Act debates favoring stronger investor protection, as its focus remained squarely on facilitating capital formation. Although the SEC did obtain several important modifications to the bill, it was unable to secure the longer statute of
limitations and aiding and abetting liability that it has long advocated for
the national standards. 280 State regulators opposed the Uniform Standards
Act, but as with NSMIA, they had little impact on the final product, al28 1
though their own enforcement turf was protected, as with NSMIA.
The enactment of the Uniform Standards Act provides a different perspective on the long debate over state versus federal law governing the

278. See supranote 14 and accompanying text
279. On May 13, 1998, on the floor of the Senate, Senator Sarbanes offered amendments
that would have preserved the state statute of limitations and aiding and abetting liability at
the federal level in actions that were removed to federal court. These amendments were

defeated. 144 CONG. REC. S4804 (daily ed. May 13, 1998).
280. See May 19 Levitt Testimony, supra note 103, at 15 ("The Commission continues to
favor legislation restoring a private right of action for aiding and abetting and lengthening
the federal securities law statute of limitations.") (statement of Arthur Levitt).
281. See, e.g., House Testimony of Blake Campbell, Ass't Comm'r, Securities Regulation
& A. Peter Kezirian,Jr., Gen. Counsel, Cal. Dept. of Corp., at 6 (May 19, 1998) (endorsing
Uniform Standards Act, while opposing "any attempt to infringe on California's authority

to pursue violators of its own laws and any federal legislative language which might be
construed to prevent the bringing of public enforcement actions in either state or federal

courts"). NSMIA specifically preserved state enforcement authority over misstatements in
public offerings. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c).
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rights and responsibilities of corporations. Advocates of investor protection have long argued that states competing for corporate charters are
caught in a "race to the bottom," pandering to well-organized corporate
managers at the expense of investors. 282 The solution to this problem, they
say, is to eliminate that competition among the states through federal corporate chartering-only at the federal level can investors be adequately
protected. 283 But in passing the Uniform Standards Act, Congress expressed no more concern for small investors than state legislatures have in
setting the parameters for corporate charters. Post-Reform Act, state blue
sky laws afforded investors greater protections on a number of fronts than
did the federal standard. The Uniform Standards Act sets the sun on those
blue sky laws, showing that federal law can hardly be considered a panacea
for investor protection.

282. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
283. For a public choice critique of this argument, see Mary E. Kostel, Note: A Public
Choice Perspectiveon the Debate Over Federal Versus State CorporateLaw, 79 VA. L. REV. 2129 (1993)
(arguing that "federally created legislation may actually be less shareholder protective than
legislation that arises out of competition between the states").

